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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the question of whether legal professionals take
responsibility for legal outcomes.1 The legal profession is a service industry
that provides a wide range of knowledge-based services to individuals,
businesses, governments, and numerous other entities, perpetuating the lore
that lawyers “adhere to strict standards of professionalism rather than the
morals of the marketplace.”2 Law, as an epistemic profession of persuasion, is
inextricably tied to both legal reasoning and moral responsibility.3 Lawyers
use legal reasoning and analysis to counsel clients, structure transactions, draft
contracts and wills, write briefs, make oral arguments to judges and juries, and
provide other legal services. Judges are the dispensers of legal reasoning.
Based on legal reasoning, judges issue orders, rule on motions, and write
judicial opinions.4 Law professors teach legal reasoning to prepare future
lawyers and judges.5 They write articles and books to influence legal
outcomes, judicial opinions, and legislation.6 Almost every form of legal
services, whether oral or written, relies on legal reasoning and analysis.
However, the relationship between reasoning and responsibility is far from
clear. This study presses the legal community to both recognize and clarify the
relationship.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically point out that
codified ethics and laws do not exhaust the lawyer’s professional
responsibilities. “[A] lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the

1. In understanding the argument of this study, a few basic terminological clarifications are
called for. The phrases “legal professionals” and “legal analysts” include lawyers, judges, law
professors, and lawmakers. The phrases “legal outcomes” and “legal services” include written
and oral legal products of lawyers, opinions and decisions of judges, writings and presentations of
law professors, constitutions, statutes, and regulations that lawmakers endorse, enact, or
authorize. The phrases “legal reasoning” and “legal analysis” include substantive analyses,
procedural tactics, and litigation and settlement strategies. The phrase “legal materials” includes
constitutions, cases, statutes, regulations, treaties, and treatises.
2. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1907 (2008).
3. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 4–5 (1953)
(distinguishing profession from business, and arguing that profit is not the primary calling of a
profession); Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58 RUTGERS L.
REV. 653, 659 (2006) (discussing law’s epistemic integrity and its relationship with ethics).
4. See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2d prtg.
1950).
5. At Washburn University School of Law, I introduced and taught for many years a firstyear course called Legal Systems, in which I explored the various genres of legal reasoning and
their impact on lawyering, legal theory, theories of adjudication, and dispute resolution. See also
Ali Khan, Learning Legal Reasoning by John Delaney, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 265, 268 (1991) (book
review).
6. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 888, 890 (2009).
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approbation of professional peers.”7 Therefore, in exploring connections
between reasoning and responsibility, the dictates of personal conscience and
peers’ approbation cannot be set aside. While the approbation of professional
peers is not critically examined in this study, the lawyer’s reputation in the
legal community is the “most important professional asset[]” that no lawyer
can afford to squander.8 Enjoying a good reputation among professional peers
and providing legal services consistent with laws and ethics, though
commendable, do not automatically vouchsafe the lawyer’s consciential
responsibilities.
Questions arise whether personal conscience does and ought to influence
the lawyer’s legal reasoning, and whether the lawyer should ever engage in
legal reasoning that alienates the lawyer from personal conscience. What is the
lawyer’s responsibility if legal reasoning found in cases and statutes cannot be
reconciled with the dictates of personal conscience? Instead of furnishing
clarity, as the discussion below demonstrates, ethical and legal conventions
obfuscate and even prevent, legal professionals from taking consciential
responsibility for legal reasoning.9
The confusion accumulates because ethical and legal conventions
champion two conflicting prescriptions. The first prescription, here called the
“dissociation paradigm,” instructs legal professionals to separate personal
predispositions from legal analysis and respect law as an objective aggregation
of norms.10 The second prescription, called the “ownership principle,”
instructs legal professionals not to set aside personal conscience in providing
legal services.11 The two prescriptions pull in opposite directions. The
dissociation paradigm claims to preserve the objectivity of law by requiring
legal professionals to separate personal self from legal reasoning.12 The

7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010). The 1908 American Bar
Association Canons of Professional Ethics also emphasized that the lawyer, while pressing the
client’s case, “must obey his own conscience and not that of the client.” ABA, CANONS OF
PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). For a discussion of ethics and conscience, see Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1959 (2006).
8. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
10. The dissociation paradigm shares close ties with legal positivism under which law is
separated from morality. The dominance of legal positivism, fueled by Jeremy Bentham, John
Austin, H.L.A. Hart, and Hans Kelsen, has been influential in theories of adjudication, demanding
that judges enforce the law and not morality. For a recent critique of legal positivism, see
Richard Mullender, Law, Morality and the Egalitarian Philosophy of Government, 29 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 389, 390 (2009). Ronald Dworkin, the chief critic of legal positivism, has been
arguing for the fusion of law and morality. For recent commentary on Dworkin’s law and moral
fusion, see T.R.S. Allan, Law, Justice and Integrity: The Paradox of Wicked Laws, 29 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2009).
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
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ownership principle offers a more integrated domain of law, ethics, and
personal conscience, and it requires legal professionals to engage in reasoning
under their mutual constraints.13 Consequently, law and ethics inform personal
conscience, and personal conscience illuminates law and ethics. The
ownership principle reformulates—but does not undermine—the notions of
legal objectivity and rule of law.14
In considering the dynamics of consciential responsibility, the dissociation
paradigm must not be confused with dissociative disorders. Whereas
dissociation is a professional skill, dissociative disorders are mental
pathologies.15 The two are not the same. The most obvious difference
between the two is the element of deliberation. Dissociation is a deliberative
skill that legal professionals exercise to wear on professional personality and to
separate legal reasoning from personal preferences.16 Dissociative disorders
are non-volitional disabilities and fantasies.17 Frequently used as a defense in
criminal cases, the defendant pleads a dissociative disorder to deny
wrongfulness and the concomitant responsibility for crime.18
The conflicting prescriptions of dissociation and ownership may be
superficially synthesized by arguing that while legal professionals must
separate personal predispositions from legal analysis, they need not abdicate
personal conscience.19 This synthesis presumes that personal conscience is
something inherently good that must be esteemed, whereas personal
predispositions, such as ideological, political, social, and economic views, are
biases that must be precluded. This synthesis also presumes that legal

13. See discussion infra Part V.B.
14. As will be discussed in Part V, however, the ownership principle explores more
sophisticated connections between law, ethics, and personal conscience.
15. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 837 n.563 (2009).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 477, 484 (4th ed., 4th
prtg. 1995) [hereinafter DSM-IV]
18. For example, dissociate identity disorder (multiple personality disorder) was described as
“a condition where the physical body belonged to two or more distinct, well-integrated
personalities, each with a separate set of memories that the other is completely unaware of.”
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Tenn. 1989) (citing testimony from a forensic psychologist).
In murder cases, the defendant may rely on a dissociative disorder to claim that the person who
killed the victim was not him, but someone else in his body or that someone else in his body
forced the defendant to kill the victim. The defendant thus claims that more than one person, with
diverse and even diametrically opposed views, resides in the same physical person. Courts and
juries may or may not believe in the concept of multiple personalities, which becomes even
trickier when defendants feign dissociative disorders after the commission of the crime. See also
DSM-IV, supra note 17, at 487.
19. See Mullender, supra note 10, at 390 (citing John Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM.
J. JURIS. 1, 23 (2007)).
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professionals are psychologically equipped to separate personal conscience
from personal dispositions. This Article does not embrace any such superficial
synthesis.
To some extent, a person’s critical self-awareness, anchored in knowledge
and reflection, can reduce negative predispositions and promote good
conscience.20 For the most part, however, personal preferences emanate from
a complex web of predispositions and personal conscience.21 It is unrealistic to
expect that legal professionals have no personal preferences (biases) about
legal issues and that their minds ought to be ideological tabula rasa while
engaging in legal reasoning. Any such expectation, noted Justice Rehnquist,
endorses lawyers and judges with lack of competence and experience, “not
lack of bias.”22 The ownership principle recognizes that the mind of the legal
professional cannot be severed from one’s biography and life experiences,
though a critical self-awareness of life experiences generates a robust force that
shapes the legal professional’s personal idealism and “plan of action.”23
Understanding the difficulty of separating predispositions from personal
conscience, this Article explores the systemic effects of dissociation and
ownership prescriptions on consciential responsibilities. Parts II and III
examine ratio-moral tensions and the related dynamics of personal conscience.
This discussion underscores the value of integrating the personal idealism of
legal professionals with their professional work. Parts IV and V analyze
dissociation and ownership prescriptions. This analysis demonstrates that each
prescription carries significant normative weight but requires a sophisticated
understanding for its application to legal reasoning. After explaining
comparative merits and demerits of the two prescriptions, Part VI explores the
art of gaming under which legal professionals implement personal preferences
but fake subscription to the dissociation paradigm.
The Article has a prescriptive purpose. It recommends that legal
professionals, though they must reject unnecessary excesses of each
prescription, choose the ownership principle over the dissociation paradigm.
The ownership principle sensitizes legal professionals to the morality and
consequences of legal outcomes; it affirms personal conscience as a critical
normative filter; and it promotes what Professor Trevor Farrow calls

20. See John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal
Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 342–43
(2008) (explaining how self-awareness promotes emotional intelligence, fosters honesty and
trustworthiness, and guides decisions).
21. See infra Part III.
22. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972).
23. Winfried Brugger, Dignity, Rights, and Legal Philosophy Within the Anthropological
Cross of Decision-Making, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1243, 1245 (2008).
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“sustainable professionalism.”24 The study proposes that legal professionals
recognize the value of an inter-connected normative domain of laws, ethics,
and personal conscience, a domain in which all three normative systems are
simultaneously present and connected with each other. This connectionist
model, explained in this Article as it applies to legal reasoning, illuminates
consciential responsibilities that legal professionals of all stripes must accept
while providing professional services derived from laws and consistent with
ethics.25
I. RATIO-MORAL TENSIONS
This part explains ratio-moral tensions that the legal system generates and
that legal professionals may experience in providing legal services. Ratiomoral tensions refer to consciential moral dilemmas and anxieties in the realm
of legal reasoning.26 This part also introduces cognitive dissonance, a concept
of psychology that explains why persons facing ratio-moral tensions
experience discomfort and strive to minimize these tensions in order to feel
good and satisfy the personal need for consistency.27 An examination of
cognitive dissonance and associated ratio-moral tensions furnish a context for
understanding the dynamics and limitations of the dissociation paradigm.
A.

Cognitive Dissonance

In his seminal work on cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger argues that
dissonance occurs when “persons sometimes find themselves doing things that
do not fit with what they know, or having opinions that do not fit with other
opinions they hold.”28 Festinger also argues that those who experience
24. Trevor C.W. Farrow, Sustainable Professionalism, 10 GERMAN L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
1001, 1004–07 (2009).
25. For a background understanding of connectionist psychology, see CONNECTIONIST
MODELS IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (George Houghton ed., 2005). For an overview of
connectionism, see James Garson, Connectionism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(July 27, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism.
26. I offer the term ratio-moral tensions to describe a combination of rational and moral
concerns that legal professionals may have in arguing for certain legal outcomes. For example, a
judge who personally opposes abortion is likely to experience ratio-moral anxiety while enforcing
the state’s permissive abortion laws. As compared to purely rational or moral tensions, the
concept of ratio-moral tensions is presented to claim that a person’s morality and rationality are
often inextricably tied to each other and may not be severable. See DAVID MOSHMAN,
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND IDENTITY 117
(2d ed. 2005).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 4 (Stanford Univ. Press 1979)
(1957). Numerous legal scholars refer to cognitive dissonance in analyzing legal issues. See,
e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1258 (2002); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad
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cognitive dissonance suffer from “psychological discomfort,”29 and persons
suffering from cognitive dissonance undergo internal pressure to reduce
dissonance.30 Dissonance reduction is as critical for human beings, says
Festinger, as is hunger reduction or frustration reduction, and persons strive to
reduce dissonance in proportion to the magnitude of dissonance.31
Contrary to Festinger’s observations, the dissociation paradigm demands
cognitive dissonance; it requires legal professionals to set aside personal
conscience and apply law, particularly if personal conscience is incompatible
with legal reasoning. Furthermore, contrary to Festinger’s thesis of natural
behavior, the dissociation paradigm teaches suppression and not reduction of
dissonance. The more the legal professional experiences dissonance in a
particular case, the more the legal professional must suppress personal
preferences in favor of legal reasoning that the law supposedly dictates.32 This
unnatural and possibly mentally unhealthy approach to legal reasoning is
ignored in defending the dissociation paradigm.33
Cognitive dissonance may also arise in the realm of ethics. It occurs when
a certain professional ethic is at odds with the personal conscience of the legal
professional, that is, with his or her personal sense of justice, personal view of
fairness, and personal code of right and wrong.34 Cognitive dissonance may
occur when the legal professional violates ethical rules of responsibility, but
only if the legal professional has intrinsic respect for those rules.35 The
ultimate test of cognitive dissonance focuses on the violation of personal
conscience rather than the violation of an externally imposed ethics code.36
Should legal professionals claim recusal for cognitive dissonance?
Suppose a pro-life judge, who abhors all forms of abortion, is presiding over a
civil case involving a physician whose license to practice medicine has been

Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1549, 1571 (2009) (book review); Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 428 (1999);
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 405 (2010).
29. FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 2.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 3–4.
32. See Ronald Turner, On Parents Involved and the Problematic Praise of Justice Clarence
Thomas, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225, 238 (2010) (commenting upon the Justice’s assertion
that judges must decide cases on the basis of law and not personal preferences).
33. See FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 3.
34. For example, billable hours, even when ethically allocated to a client, may be excessive.
Additionally, a lawyer may charge two clients for the same duration of time. For a discussion of
such dilemmas, see Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates,
45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 231 (2007).
35. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 191 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
36. See FESTINGER, supra note 28, at 1–2.
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suspended for violating abortion procedures or a criminal case where such a
physician has been killed. The judge holds a special grudge against physicians
who assist in abortion procedures and holds a secret belief that such physicians
engage in murder. With such strong sentiments against abortion, judges may
recuse themselves from abortion cases to avoid cognitive dissonance.37 Under
the dissociation paradigm, the judge would be asked to set aside his personal
views about abortion and rule on the case objectively and according to the
rules.38
Dead conscience or cynicism unlikely to generate ratio-moral tensions is
rarely the reigning presumption of any legal system. Cynical attitudes that
subscribe to no notion of justice, fairness, or morality perhaps lend to no
cognitive dissonance because cynicism discounts the role of personal
conscience and denies responsibility.39 In unjust legal systems, such as the
apartheid system in South Africa, legal professionals may resist rather than
support oppressive laws.40 In such cases, legal professionals may honestly
believe that the laws are unjust. Doubts about an unjust legal system are not
cynical. What undermines cognitive dissonance and the concomitant notion of
responsibility is the legal professional’s rejection of personal notions of justice,
fairness, and morality.41 Legal professionals are unlikely to assume any
personal responsibility if no notion of justice, fairness, or morality is part of
their personal conscience. Conscience-free legal professionals are cynical
operators who use legal reasoning without assuming any personal
responsibility.42
B.

Reasoning and Responsibility

In legal literature, legal reasoning and moral responsibility are rarely
examined together, even though the pair is the primary source of ratio-moral
tensions.43 Legal reasoning is perhaps the most cherished concept in the legal
profession as law students, lawyers, and judges master the art and science of

37. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 248 (2007).
38. Id. at 250 n.130 (noting legislative intent does not allow judges to opt out of abortion
cases for moral reasons) (citing Ann Crawford McClure et al., A Guide to Proceedings Under the
Texas Parental Notification Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 755, 801 (2000)).
39. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 190–91.
40. See KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW 1–29 (2000) (recounting Godfrey Pitje, a prominent black lawyer who resisted
apartheid laws).
41. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
547, 597–98 (2008).
42. See id. at 597–601 (analyzing cynical advocacy).
43. In law, these words rarely constitute a pair, as do, for example, tort and liability or crime
and punishment.
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legal argumentation. Legal reasoning embodied in professional products44
supplies, legitimizes, and defends legal outcomes. Ratio-moral tensions are
generated when legal reasoning points toward conflicting legal outcomes,
forcing legal professionals to choose one over the other.45
In addition to legal reasoning, the concept of responsibility also generates
ratio-moral tensions as legal professionals confront questions of responsibility
in cases where law does not comport with their personal conscience.46 Such
tensions may appear in almost all areas of substantive and procedural law.
Responsibility is an integral part of legal ethics.47 Ordinarily, however, ethics
relate responsibility to professional conduct and not to legal reasoning. In
codes of ethics, nowhere is responsibility specifically tied to legal reasoning,
except that the rules of professional conduct caution lawyers not to bring or
defend frivolous cases.48 Frivolous cases, at times indistinguishable from
groundbreaking cases, are arguably associated with some sort of unacceptable
legal reasoning.
Professor Bradley Wendel argues that law defines the interpretive
parameters within which lawyers must engage in analysis.49 “Lawyers cannot
understand their role as merely executing their clients’ preferences; the
distinctive function of lawyers is that they act as agents of their clients, but
only within the bounds of the law.”50 This statement, though a professional
truism, sheds little informative light on ratio-moral tensions that legal
professionals regularly face “within the bounds of law.”
Ratio-moral tensions emanating from legal reasoning and personal
conscience may affect legal professionals differently. Judges’ ratio-moral
tensions may or may not be the same as those of lawyers. Judges are dutybound under judicial conventions to apply the law without contaminating legal
reasoning with personal preferences.51 They cannot pick and choose cases to
44. Reasoning is also the core constitutive element of legal services and attendant
professional products. Professional products—cast in many forms, including memorandums,
pleadings, motions, briefs, oral arguments, court orders, judgments, legal commentaries, law
review articles, and treatises—are embodiments of legal reasoning.
45. Note, The Rule of Law in the Marketplace of Ideas: Pledges or Promises by Candidates
for Judicial Election, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1528–29 (2009).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010) (responsibilities of a
prosecutor); id. R. 5.1 (responsibilities of a supervisory lawyer).
48. See id. R. 3.1. See also Penny J. White, Commentary, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123
HARV. L. REV. 120, 133 (2009) (lawyers filing frivolous cases risk losing personal reputation).
49. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1362 (2009).
50. Id.
51. Note, supra note 45, at 1525 (discussing how the search for determinate sources of law,
rather than arbitrary will, continues to spawn theories such as legal science, textualism, and
originalism).
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avoid ratio-moral tensions. Nor can they openly disregard legal reasoning to
enforce their contrary personal preferences. Under these conventions,
therefore, judges can easily deny responsibility by simply asserting that they
render judicial decisions that the legal reasoning dictates. Some judges may
absorb ratio-moral tensions by confessing that a certain reasoning of law is
contrary to their deeply held values, but they are bound to enforce the law.
Some judges may resolve ratio-moral tensions by distorting the law to conform
to their personal conscience.52
Unlike judges, lawyers may minimize ratio-moral tensions by selecting
cases agreeable with their personal conscience. But for many lawyers, the
freedom to pick and choose cases might indeed be illusory. Take the
hypothetical case of a lawyer who agonizes over a murder case.53 The
economically struggling lawyer (who has set up solo practice in a small town)
is appointed to defend an indigent person charged with murder. The defendant
had signed a properly notarized confession of the crime. In the very first
meeting, the defendant confesses to the appointed lawyer that the defendant
has committed the crime. However, the defendant asks the lawyer to enter a
not guilty plea.
The client regrets his confession to the authorities and at trial wants to take
the stand in his own defense and offer perjured testimony. Using her
independent judgment, the lawyer believes that the defendant has indeed
committed the crime. The lawyer is morally and ethically opposed to entering
a not guilty plea on the client’s behalf. The attorney’s opposition to entering a
not guilty plea for a client she believes is guilty has been partly informed by
her personal conscience and partly by codes of professional responsibility that
prohibit lawyers from offering evidence that the lawyers know is false.54

52. See id. at 1528–29.
53. The facts of this hypothetical are adapted from a few cases: United States v. Baker, 65
M.J. 691 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007); Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2007); and
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 2003).
54. See, e.g., MASS. BAR INST., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1998). Paragraph (e) of
Rule 3.3, entitled “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” provides, in pertinent part:
In a criminal case, defense counsel who knows that the defendant, the client, intends
to testify falsely may not aid the client in constructing false testimony, and has a duty
strongly to discourage the client from testifying falsely, advising that such a course is
unlawful, will have substantial adverse consequences, and should not be followed. . . . If
a criminal trial has commenced and the lawyer discovers that the client intends to testify
falsely at trial, the lawyer need not file a motion to withdraw from the case if the lawyer
reasonably believes that seeking to withdraw will prejudice the client. If, during the
client’s testimony or after the client has testified, the lawyer knows that the client has
testified falsely, the lawyer shall call upon the client to rectify the false testimony and, if
the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall not reveal the false testimony to
the tribunal. In no event may the lawyer examine the client in such a manner as to elicit
any testimony from the client the lawyer knows to be false, and the lawyer shall not argue
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Driven by the need to make a living to support her family, however, the lawyer
makes an exception to her personal conscience and provides legal services in
the case.
The lawyer tries to minimize her ratio-moral tensions by suppressing
personal conscience, which directs the lawyer not to accept the case. She
persuades herself that the rule of confidentiality forbids her from
communicating the defendant’s plan to offer perjured testimony to the court
and petitioning the court for her withdrawal from the case.55 The lawyer finds
comfort in the rule that she has a duty to represent the client. She also
entertains the possibility that the defendant might have falsely confessed to the
crime, both to the police and to her. The lawyer considers the question of
personal responsibility and concludes, though a bit uncomfortably, that she is
not personally responsible if the defendant offers perjured testimony at trial to
contest his notarized confession. While she is unsure about the conviction with
which she would speak to the jury that her client’s notarized confession was
involuntarily given, she believes that it is the prosecutor’s job, not hers, to
prove each element of the defendant’s crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
lawyer resolves ratio-moral tensions by persuading herself that it is the client’s
decision to lie on the stand and it is up to the jury whether they believe the
defendant’s story.56
The story of Gorilla Law provides useful insights into ratio-moral tensions
of a different genre.57 Gorilla Law is a modest booklet that lays out grievance
procedures for prison inmates to assert their constitutional rights. The booklet
portrays prison inmates as the victims of “lawyers who never provided any
semblance of representation, the district attorneys who built their careers on
[their] back[s], [and] the judges who expediently handed out justice for the
sake of the noon recess.”58 Dave Davis, a California ex-convict, urges inmates
to file multiple complaints about attorney misbehavior and judicial
misconduct, turning “the powers of the state against itself.”59
the probative value of the false testimony in closing argument or in any other proceedings,
including appeals.
Id.
55. Several solutions have been explored to respond to client’s perjury, including
withdrawing from the case, allowing the client to make the statement but not commenting on it to
the jury, telling the client at the outset that perjury is not within the client-attorney privilege, and
reporting the perjured statement to the tribunal. For a discussion of these ideas, see VINCENT
LUIZZI, A CASE FOR LEGAL ETHICS: LEGAL ETHICS AS A SOURCE FOR A UNIVERSAL ETHIC 13–
14 (1993).
56. See id. at 13. Is the lawyer responsible if the defendant commits perjury, successfully
lies to the jury, and is acquitted?
57. DAVE DAVIS, GORILLA LAW (1981).
58. Id. at Acknowledgements.
59. Id. at 7, 19–23. The cover of the booklet shows a frowning King Kong-size gorilla,
stomping on the roof of the county jail with broken bars, and holding a captured aircraft labeled
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Gorilla Law became an object of litigation when prison officials at an
Arkansas maximum security unit denied inmates their claimed First
Amendment right to receive the booklet.60 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit opined that although the booklet “advocates the use of
prisoner grievance procedures and urges inmates to exercise their rights, and in
that sense is unobjectionable, the tone of the publication is relentlessly hostile
to prison officials and to authority in general.”61 Vengeful attitudes that the
booklet promotes, the court held, cannot be reconciled with the goal of
prisoners’ rehabilitation.62 The dissenting judge declared Gorilla Law to be a
“harmless document” and pointed out that the prison warden did not even read
the booklet before he ordered it confiscated as contraband.63
Consider how the law itself generates ratio-moral tensions. The author of
Gorilla Law has the First Amendment right to publish the booklet with a
rational plan to influence the behavior of prison inmates. As an ex-convict
who had faced difficulty in the prison, the author may have developed a
genuine moral responsibility to help inmates. Arguably, the author could have
plotted a mischievous agenda to mobilize the booklet to create disorder in
prisons. Still the law, in permitting the publication of the booklet, protects the
author’s rational but morally dubious agenda. Regardless of the author’s moral
intentions, prison officials and judges have their own reasons to ban the
booklet from reaching prison inmates. Consequently, a booklet publishable by
the force of law (under the First Amendment) cannot by the force of law
(prison rules) reach its intended audience.
In allowing ratio-moral tensions, the system aggregates the conflicting
notions of responsibility. With respect to Gorilla Law, neither the author, nor
prison officials, nor judges could be blamed for their divergent viewpoints and
legal reasoning on the same issues. Even the dissenting judge, who supports
the author and disagrees with prison officials and colleagues on the bench, is
free of blame, since dissent is a cherished common law tradition of judicial
decision-making. We do not know, perhaps cannot know, whether prison
officials and judges were using legal reasoning in harmony with or dissociated
from personal conscience.64

“sheriff” in one hand while three other aircraft frighteningly circle around the gorilla’s imposing
black and white torso. See id.
60. See Travis v. Norris, 805 F.2d 806, 807 (8th Cir. 1986).
61. Id. at 808.
62. Id. at 809.
63. Id. at 809, 811 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Litigation came to an end, however, when the
court declined to rehear the case. Id. at 806, reh’g denied. The booklet was banned from the
prison, thus denying the booklet access to its intended audience. Id. at 809.
64. See infra discussion of secrecy in Part VI.A.
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Routinely, the legal system generates and absorbs ratio-moral tensions. It
permits the coexistence of incompatible modes and effects of law and legal
reasoning.
Legal reasoning rarely dictates one and only one legal
consequence.
Frequently, legal reasoning supplies multiple normative
choices.65 The generation of incompatible modes and effects of legal
reasoning might be nourishing for an open, diverse, and vigorous legal
discourse. In advocating and reaching legal outcomes, the legal system
supplies plentiful normative space within which legal professionals may either
dissociate legal reasoning from personal conscience or may summon personal
The
conscience to inform legal reasoning and its consequences.66
connectionist model of legal reasoning does not propose to exclude laws,
ethics, or personal conscience.67 All these systems must be brought to bear in
the construction of legal reasoning and the consequent minimization of ratiomoral tensions.
II. PERSONAL CONSCIENCE
This part argues that personal conscience is a critical normative filter that
legal professionals must employ while providing legal services. It also
discusses ratio-moral tensions that legal professionals experience when they
act contrary to the moral gravity of personal conscience. This discussion
clarifies that legal professionals must function within the inter-connected
normative domain of laws, ethics, and personal conscience. Just as legal
professionals cannot ignore laws or ethics in solving legal problems, they must
not suppress the calls of personal conscience in serving clients, deciding cases,
teaching law, or in any other matters related to law and legal reasoning. Law,
ethics, and personal conscience must not be treated as separate conduits, for
they constitute a fluid aggregation of inter-connected flows.68
In endorsing the connectionist web of responsibilities, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct use the phrase “personal conscience” and not

65. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 56 (1964). “There are
comparatively few cases . . . in which the relevant rules of law are uncertain. What is more often
uncertain is, what is the right rule to apply.” Id. (quoting LORD WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 343 (1939)).
66. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115 (13th prtg.
1921). Cardozo invokes the metaphor of “open spaces” within which the judge makes the law
when there are no rules to be found. Id. Compare this with Lord Wright’s view, which
subscribes to many applicable rules and describes the challenge for the judge as picking the
appropriate rule for the case. See STONE, supra note 65, at 56.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 1–27.
68. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
53–54 (1998) (explaining that each cognitive element exerts influence on cognitive elements to
which it is connected, thus creating a mutually constrained aggregate).
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conscience,69 implying that personal conscience is an individualized
infrastructure of morality, ideology, perspectives, views, and other mental
processes. For purposes of this discussion, personal conscience constitutes the
internal ethics of a legal professional. Even though legal professionals draw
internal ethics from family, school, society, culture, and other institutions in
which they participate, personal conscience varies from person to person.
Personal conscience is both subjective and inter-subjective.70 It is both unique
and participatory.71 It is both personal and communitarian.72 Personal
conscience that shares nothing with community values is atypical, and possibly
pathological. Personal conscience that absorbs community values without
reflection or critical evaluation lacks personal identity and is susceptible to
prejudice, bigotry, and other negative values of the community. Needless to
say, personal conscience is rarely etched in stone; it progresses, regresses, and
changes with knowledge and experience.73
Note further that the Model Rules instruct lawyers to be “also guided by
personal conscience.”74 The “also” language clarifies that personal conscience
cannot be the sole driver of the lawyer’s professional responsibilities. The
Model Rules, however, recognize the significance of personal conscience in
the domain of professional responsibility. They do not dissociate personal
ethics from professional ethics. Avoiding dissociation, lawyers are free to
practice in areas of law compatible with their personal conscience.75
Unlike lawyers, other legal professionals, particularly judges, may not be
explicitly permitted to import personal conscience into their decision-making.
The professional ethics for judges provide no allowance for personal
conscience.76 Law professors are well situated to engage in teaching and
scholarship most compatible with their personal values, ethical preferences,
moral choices, and religious beliefs.77 But even law professors may lose peer
approbation and chances for professional advancement if their writings spill far
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010).
70. PAUL HERNADI, CULTURAL TRANSACTIONS: NATURE, SELF, SOCIETY 2–3 (1995)
(growing recognition of three-dimensionality of being human, subjective, objective, and
intersubjective).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. BARBARA M. STILWELL ET AL., RIGHT VERSUS WRONG—RAISING A CHILD WITH A
CONSCIENCE, at ix (2000).
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010).
75. Lance McMillian, Tortured Souls: Unhappy Lawyers Viewed Through the Medium of
Film, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 31, 83 (2009).
76. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). “The United States legal
system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary . . .
will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.” Id. pmbl. ¶ 1.
77. Even lawmakers must selectively compose personal conscience into the legislative
process, as they may not be reelected if they act contrary to the will of the people.
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out of the mainstream. This varying affordability of composing personal
conscience into professional work raises a simple but fundamental question:
What is personal conscience?
While the Model Rules recognize the importance of personal conscience,
the definition of personal conscience is far from clear. There is an unspoken
presumption that personal conscience embodies a sense of right and wrong and
carries notions of justice, fairness, and morality.78 Few would argue that
personal inclinations for discrimination, prejudice, hostility, violence, injustice,
and cruelty are parts of conscience, even though such inclinations cannot be
completely expelled from the human mind.79 In its ordinary meaning, personal
conscience is rarely identified with prejudice or bigotry.80 The development of
personal conscience in religious cultures, for example, is likely to be different
from the development of personal conscience in cultures that champion moral
relativity or amoral professionalism. Believers of natural law might assert that
human beings are born with innate and universal notions of morality and
fairness.81 Others might argue that personal conscience is a social and cultural
construct.82 While the precise formation of personal conscience is perhaps
unknowable, most legal systems continue to rely on personal conscience
regardless of its constitutive sources.
A.

Calls of Personal Conscience

In common law, the notion of conscience entered early and forcefully into
the judicial system.83 In many cases, conscience was invoked to mitigate the
harshness of laws.84 The Court of Chancery was established as a court of

78. See Jon C. Dalton et al., Maintaining and Modeling Everyday Ethics in Student Affairs,
in THE HANDBOOK OF STUDENT AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION 166, 172–73 (George S. McClellan
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
79. See ROBERT W. CRAPPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 247–48
(1986).
80. In dictionaries, for example, conscience is defined in moral terms, excluding immoral
elements such as bigotry or prejudice. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 387 (2d ed. 1983).
81. William E. May, Conscience Formation and the Teaching of the Church, 87 HOMILETIC
& PASTORAL REV. 11, 11–20 (1986), reprinted in WHY HUMANAE VITAE WAS RIGHT 363, 369–
70 (Janet E. Smith ed., 1993).
82. Bertrand Russell declares that conscience is territorial, not universal. BERTRAND
RUSSELL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE (1935), reprinted in RUSSELL ON ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM
THE WRITINGS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL 131, 136–37 (Charles R. Pigden ed., 1999). Hence,
personal conscience in Kansas is not the same as personal conscience in Japan, Jordan, or
Mongolia. Yet not every Kansan shares the same personal conscience with fellow Kansans.
83. See DENNIS R. KLINCK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1 (2010).
84. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 87–90 (illustrating classic example of how a
court of law would force a debtor to repay the same loan twice).
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conscience in which equity, rather than law, informed judicial decisionmaking.85 The Court of Chancery was a court of empathy launched to protect
the poor and public servants.86 A classical case of debt illuminates the
difference between the court of law and the court of conscience. A debtor paid
his loan but neglected to retrieve the bond from the lender.87 The common law
judges refused relief on the ground that relief would support the debtor’s
“folly.”88 The chancellor asked the lender to bring the bond to the court. The
chancellor cancelled the bond, remarking that “‘God is the guardian of
fools.’”89 The chancellor, frequently a church official, was “the only dispenser
of the king’s conscience.”90
Even though conscience is frequently associated with equity, common law
itself recognizes honesty, fairness, good faith, and other elements that
constitute the notion of conscience. In 1909, Professor George Trumbull Ladd
challenged mechanical conceptions of law by arguing that judges of law are no
less than duty-bound to guide themselves by “justice, equity, and good
conscience.”91
In historical phraseology of common law, a term like the King’s
conscience sounds high and mighty, signifying royal prerogative; however, the
notion of conscience was by no means an elitist or ecclesiastic construction.
Ordinary members of the community, such as jurors, are as entitled as judges
or, for that matter, the King to rely on personal conscience in reaching verdicts.
Each juror hears the evidence, weighs conflicting stories told in the courtroom,
and discusses the case with fellow jurors. But, in the end, each juror must
reach a verdict as an individual and not as a corporate member of the jury. In
reaching the verdict, the juror may rely on personal conscience to determine
the outcome. Whether a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is not
an automatic, law-prompted, analytical decision; it is a call of personal
conscience. Courts recognize each juror’s personal conscience as a factor in
jury decisions and declare that “the law cannot and should not probe into
matters of personal conscience.”92 Courts may encourage an indecisive jury to
reach a verdict, but any such charge must also admonish the jury “that each

85. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2009).
86. See 1 EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 111 (reprt. 1926).
87. Id. at 128.
88. Id. (recalling an historic case). See also Kraus & Scott, supra note 85, at 1038 (citing
Glaston v. Abbot of Crowland (1330), reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY:
PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 252 (J.H. Baker & S.F.C. Milsom eds., 1986)).
89. CHEYNEY, supra note 86, at 128.
90. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 42, at 47 (W.H. Lyon,
Jr. ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1886).
91. George Trumbull Ladd, Ethics and the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 613, 619 (1909).
92. See, e.g., Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 2006).
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individual juror not surrender his or her honest convictions and not to return
any verdict contrary to the dictates of personal conscience.”93 William
Blackstone commended the practice of the juries to do the right thing.94
Some judges in the United States seem uncomfortable with the idea of
summoning personal conscience as a judicial metric in deciding cases. In
1983, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the “shock the conscience of
appellate court” test for reviewing sentences given by trial courts.95 However,
the appellate judges expressed great discomfort with the personal conscience
test and viewed it as subjective and without any guidelines.96 Seven years
later, the Michigan Supreme Court scrapped the “shock the conscience” test
and instead adopted the proportionality standard, which reviews whether the
sentence is proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.97
Despite judicial reservations to its application in select cases,98 personal
conscience is a significant part of American judicial philosophy. Thousands of
cases turn upon the “shock the conscience” test.99 For example, in
Connecticut, the courts could overturn a jury award for economic damages in
negligence cases if the award is so low or so high that it shocks the conscience
of the court.100 New York courts refuse to enforce “unconscionable bargains”
that shock the conscience of the court.101 California courts consider a
punishment cruel and unusual under the California Constitution if the
punishment is so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience of
the court.102 Florida courts hold that fundamental rights granted under the
93. Brown v. State, 369 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1976). Compare id. (setting aside verdict
where jurors not admonished to retain conscience), with Davis v. State, No. 119, 1998, 1999 WL
86055, at *3 (Del. Jan. 20, 1999) (holding that instruction to reach decision, when coupled with
admonition to follow personal conscience, was not coercive).
94. Common law juries developed a practice of finding the value of stolen goods to be less
than twelve pence to avoid the mandatory death penalty for theft of goods over twelve pence.
Blackstone called such practice “pious perjury.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*239.
95. People v. Coles, 339 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Mich. 1983).
96. People v. Rutherford, 364 N.W.2d 305, 308–10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (Shepherd, J.,
concurring).
97. People v. Milbourn, 461 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1990).
98. See, e.g., id.; Rutherford, 364 N.W.2d at 308–10.
99. A Westlaw search shows that between January 1, 2009 and August 15, 2009, more than
700 cases contained the “shock the conscience” search term.
100. See, e.g., Earlington v. Anastasi, 976 A.2d 689, 697 (Conn. 2009); Childs v. Bainer, 663
A.2d 398, 402 (Conn. 1995).
101. See, e.g., Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 854–55 (N.Y. 1977) (noting use of
“shock the conscience” as component to unconscionability analysis); Morad v. Morad, 812
N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
102. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 719–20 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (stating the
courts should not interfere unless a punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the
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substantive due process clause of the Florida Constitution may not be taken
away by means of government conduct “so egregious that it shocks the
conscience.”103 Kansas courts uphold contract provisions “unless the provision
in question is, under the circumstances, so outrageous and unfair in its wording
or its application that it shocks the conscience or offends the sensibilities of the
court.”104 Note that Kansas courts rely not only on judicial conscience but also
on “sensibilities of the court.”
The conscience-shocking behavior test was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court, in a seminal 1952 case, to safeguard against egregious
governmental violations of Due Process protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.105 In that case, the actions taken by government agents to
procure incriminating evidence offended “even hardened sensibilities.”106
Three Los Angeles deputy sheriffs, upon receiving information that Rochin
was selling narcotics, illegally broke into the defendant’s home, invaded his
bedroom privacy where they found a partly dressed Rochin sharing the bed
with his wife.107 The deputies noticed two capsules lying on a table next to the
bed.108 When questioned about the capsules, Rochin seized and swallowed
them.109 The deputies pounced upon Rochin and physically struggled to
extract the capsules from his mouth but were unsuccessful.110 They
handcuffed Rochin and took him to the hospital.111 There, upon a deputy’s
direction, a doctor forcibly administered an emetic solution into Rochin’s body
to cause stomach pumping.112 Rochin vomited the capsules later found to
contain morphine.113
“This is conduct that shocks the conscience,” stated the Rochin Court, thus
forging ties between Due Process and judicial conscience.114 Consequently,
governmental behavior that shocks judicial conscience is a violation of Due

conscience); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972) (stating the judiciary should not
interfere unless a statutory penalty is so severe in relation to the crime that it is cruel and
unusual).
103. City of Lauderhill v. Rhames, 864 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted) (quoting Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit 215 F.3d 396, 301 (3d Cir.
2000)). See also J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla.
2000) (evaluating whether treatment of individual was “fundamentally unfair”).
104. Adams v. John Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
105. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
106. Id. at 172.
107. Id. at 166.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 172.
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Process. The Court was careful to separate conscience from “fastidious
squeamishness” and “private sentimentalism.”115 It also seemed to distinguish
between judicial conscience and “our merely personal and private notions.”116
In order to objectify judicial conscience, the Court invoked reason, decencies
of civilized conduct, a sense of justice, and the community’s sense of fair play.
Expressing discomfort with these nebulous distinctions, Justice Black saw no
difference between objectified and subjective domains of personal
conscience.117 For Justice Black, conscience is just another name for personal
ideology or what he called personal philosophy with “accordion-like
qualities.”118
B.

Elements of Personal Conscience

Justice Black made a valid observation to the extent that personal
conscience cannot be precisely defined. A lack of definition, however, is no
basis to throw away the concept of personal conscience from the realm of legal
reasoning. In a broad sense, personal conscience encompasses a legal
professional’s character, conscience, and intellectual, emotional, and moral
assets. Good faith, a fundamental concept of law that runs through the entire
legal system, is an integral part of personal conscience.119
I use the term personal conscience to specifically draw attention to three
main elements: state of knowledge, self-concept, and self-criticism. These
elements do not define personal conscience but provide valuable insights into
how personal conscience is constructed and how it is mobilized in the process
of legal reasoning.
State of Knowledge: The first element of personal conscience is the legal
professional’s state of knowledge.120 Legal professionals are generally wellinformed citizens of the community. In addition to the knowledge of law,
analytical skills, legal theory, and jurisprudence, legal professionals understand
115. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
116. Id. at 170.
117. Id. at 175–76 (Black, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 177. Personal conscience has been invoked even to criticize United States
Supreme Court decisions. Two justices of the Montana Supreme Court refused to comply with a
decision of the United States Supreme Court. “We cannot in good conscience be an instrument of
a policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental, and philosophically misguided as the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in this and other cases which interpret and apply the
Federal Arbitration Act.” Casarotto v. Lombardi, No. 93-488, at *3 (Mont. July 16, 1996)
(Trieweiler & Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
119. The classical definition of good faith means honesty in fact. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 713 (8th ed. 2004).
120. Lawyers are distinguished from other professionals based on their qualifications and
training in the legal field. Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the
Sociology of Lawyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 478, 501 (Richard L.
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
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how the legal system delivers justice and allocates social goods and resources
to various constituents. Legal professionals also accumulate extensive
knowledge about culture and social forces that influence the legal system. Of
course, knowledge is limitless.121 The state of knowledge is, therefore, a
dynamic phenomenon; it develops and matures as the legal professional gains
more knowledge, experience, and cognitive congruence. Personal conscience
as an epistemic entity develops sophistication when firmly anchored in general
and legal knowledge.122
Self-Concept: The second element of personal conscience is what Elliot
Aronson calls self-concept.123 Most people, including legal professionals,
“strive to maintain a sense of self that is both consistent and positive.”124 Like
most individuals, legal professionals have favorable views of themselves and
want to see themselves as competent, ethical, and reliable. Positive selfconcept in the case of legal professionals also includes feelings for fairness,
sentiments for morality, and desires for economic and social justice, even
though what constitutes fairness, morality, or justice may vary from person to
person and might, in some cases, be controversial. Some legal professionals
are self-righteous but rarely do they rejoice in being unfair, immoral, or unjust.
For the maintenance of self-concept, legal professionals avoid cognitive
dissonance, that is, blatant contradictions between what they say and what they
do.125 The maintenance of self-concept is both external and internal.
Externally, legal professionals avoid and hide breaches of law, ethics, and
personal conscience. External approbation of the community or professional
peers reinforces positive self-concept. Internally, legal professionals must
rationalize the breaches to themselves and find defenses and justifications for
what they do.126 Some sort of self-atonement is critical for the maintenance of
self-concept.127

121. C.L. SHENG, A UTILITARIAN GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE 84 (1998).
122. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 11 (2d prtg. 1996).
123. Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and The Self-Concept, in READINGS ABOUT THE
SOCIAL ANIMAL 227, 233 (Elliot Aronson ed., 9th ed. 2004).
124. Id.
125. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 267–68 (reprt. 2008). See also
Anthony V. Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1651,
1696–97 (2009) (citing LUBAN, supra, at 267–68) (applying David Luban’s views on dissonance
to race-based professional norms of practice).
126. “[W]e are all highly resistant to the thought of our own wrongdoing, and the result is that
we will bend our moral beliefs and even our perceptions to fight off the harsh judgment of our
own behavior.” LUBAN, supra note 125, at 269–70.
127. Cf. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 286, 297–99 (David Luban ed.,
1984) (arguing that unreconciled internal conflicts impede the understanding of others’ societal
roles and interrelations).
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Self-Criticism: The third element of personal conscience is self-criticism,
which is the ability for legal professionals to critically examine their personal
(and professional) deficiencies.128 While self-concept emphasizes personal
strengths, self-criticism points out personal weaknesses. Both self-concept and
self-criticism are parts of self-awareness. For example, a legal professional
may recognize that her knowledge in a certain discipline is inadequate. This
recognition can be an incentive for removing the deficiency. Another legal
professional may catch himself engaging in racial stereotyping. This selfdiscovery might jolt the legal professional into changing his views on race.
Self-criticism is an internal mechanism to correct personal flaws and improve
personal strengths. Self-criticism is fruitless if it causes no personal
improvement.129 In some cases, self-criticism could be pathological, leading to
stress, mental and physical harm.130 A judge may drive himself crazy by
comparing his writing abilities with those of Lord Denning, or a lawyer may
declare himself to be a failure because his trial techniques are demonstrably
inferior to those of Clarence Darrow.131 Destructive self-criticism is as
harmful to personal conscience as is the absence of self-criticism.
Even though most legal professionals have a positive self-concept, they
may nonetheless review and even change their notions of morality, justice, and
fairness. Self-criticism may also lead to the abandonment of idealism and
naïve sentiments for fairness, morality, and justice. Realizing that the world
around them cannot be neatly divided into any linear good and bad, legal
professionals may tone down their sentiments for justice and fairness and adopt
a more hard-nosed attitude toward personal, social, and economic problems.132
Even when legal professionals adopt pragmatism or compromise some deeply
held values to function in real world situations, few completely abandon the
inner voices of fairness, justice, and morality.
Employing the dynamics of knowledge, self-concept, and self-criticism,
personal conscience pursues cognitive congruence and avoids cognitive
dissonance.133 An active and engaged personal conscience assures that the
legal professional is aware of his or her preferences, prejudices, and moral
strengths and weaknesses. In light of self-awareness, most legal professionals

128. See Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1629, 1663–64 (2002).
129. RAYMOND M. BERGNER, PATHOLOGICAL SELF-CRITICISM: ASSESSMENT AND
TREATMENT 1–2 (C.R. Snyder ed., Plenum Ser. in Soc./Clinical Psychology, 1995).
130. Id. at 4–6.
131. For examples of pathological self-criticism, see id. at 2–3.
132. In William Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, the famous soliloquy “to be, or not to be”
signifies the tension between self-concept and self-criticism that leads Hamlet away from a naïve
and idealist view of the world to the stark reality of intrigue, incest, murder, and revenge.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
133. See supra notes 124–36 and accompanying text.
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strive to pursue consistency and clarity in what they believe and in what they
say or do.134 Accordingly, they avoid blatant contradictions in their speech and
deeds. With varying degrees of commitment, legal professionals may wish to
actively pursue what they believe is good, fair, and just. Self-awareness
preserves personal conscience,135 alerting legal professionals that their acts and
deeds are inconsistent or morally indefensible. Personal conscience, however,
is more than self-awareness. Personal conscience is action; it is a dynamic
force, which provides an ethical view of the world directing legal professionals
to do the right thing, causing cognitive dissonance when legal professionals
say or act contrary to their internal ethics.136
Personal conscience, as an epistemic entity, could be highly enlightened
and anchored in wisdom. In pre-legal communities, wise men and women,
including tribal chiefs, were highly regarded for their mature personality and
cognitive development.137 Even in sophisticated legal communities, the
mystique of the wise person lingers. The wise person develops personal
conscience that the community trusts and is willing to follow. Wisdom or
personal conscience is not tied to any innate or genetic sense of morality and
justice. Personal conscience for the most part is an acquired personal asset that
matures through learning, observation, reflection, and action.138 Of course,
personal conscience varies from person to person in both quality and
consistency. In some cases, personal conscience is the light of the world, but
in most cases personal conscience shares burdens and benefits of the culture in
which the individual is raised and reared.139 This study does not require legal
professionals to be prophets or messiahs but, rather, upright persons with a
developed sense of intellectual and moral integrity and, most important, the
knowledge-based will “to do the right thing.”140

134. Lawyers are driven to resolve dissonance by adjusting their principles and conduct so
that they are in harmony with one another. See LUBAN, supra note 125, at 267.
135. See Lucinda Orwoll & Marion Perlmutter, The Study of Wise Persons: Integrating a
Personality Perspective, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DEVELOPMENT 160, 161
(Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990).
136. See LUBAN, supra note 125, at 267–68.
137. Cf. EXPLORING ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS 695 (Woolf et al. eds., 2004).
138. See DAVID BOHR, CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION 171 (rev. ed. 1999) (comparing
differing developmental conceptions of conscience).
139. Stephen Fields, Mediating The Non-Christian Religions: Congar, Balthasar, Nature and
Grace, in YVES CONGAR: THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH 401, 409 (Gabriel Flynn ed., Louvain
Theological & Pastoral Monographs No. 32, 2005).
140. Herbert E. Phipps, Lawyers—The Guardians of Truth and Justice, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 483, 488 (2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

910

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:887

III. DISSOCIATION PARADIGM
Legal conventions, professional ethics, and market pressures compel legal
professionals to subscribe to the dissociation paradigm.141 The dissociation
paradigm mandates that legal professionals’ personal preferences must not
influence their legal reasoning or judgment.142 A stronger version of the
dissociation paradigm demands that legal professionals refrain from injecting
personal views, values, and opinions into the application and interpretation of
laws. They must apply the law wherever the law leads them, even if the law
offends their personal conscience. This capacity or existential will to enforce
the law contrary to personal conscience is considered the high achievement of
legal professionalism. Professionalism is seriously undermined when lawyers
and judges ignore laws and implement personal preferences. A strict
separation between legal reasoning (objective and rational) and personal
conscience (subjective and non-rational) constitutes the core of dissociation
paradigm.143
Unfortunately, while upholding the supremacy of law over personal
conscience, as discussed below, the dissociation paradigm clouds personal
responsibility and intellectual integrity of legal professionals. If legal
professionals must apply law and legal reasoning regardless of personal
conscience, it would be unfair to hold legal professionals personally
accountable for their professional services. Physicians and many other
professionals integrate rather than separate professional and personal selves.

141. See Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional
Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (2001) (arguing that legal
education continues to present law as an autonomous entity disengaged from moral
considerations).
142. The dissociation paradigm is a psychophysics concept that involves the separation of
conscious and subconscious perception. See Eyal M. Reingold, Unconscious Perception and the
Classic Dissociation Paradigm: A New Angle?, 66 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 882, 882
(2004).
143. Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in Law: Death and Other
Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1714 (1999). Professor Underkuffler draws a distinction
between what she calls “agentic” and “conscientic” models of decision making and posits that
under the agentic model, juries, judges, and executive officials decide cases according to law. Id.
at 1714. Under the conscientic model, decision makers bring in nonrational factors derived from
personal conscience. Id. The conscientic model may be used in death-penalty cases when the
agentic model fails. Id. at 1715. Professor Underkuffler concludes her article with remarkable
words:
But rare as these cases are, they serve a vital function. They remind us that we are,
in the end, personal actors in law, as in life . . . . They remind us that when we deny the
humanity of others, we should feel the prick of doubt, the sickness of conscience. . . .
They are the times when we cannot comfort ourselves with murmurs of agentic roles.
They are the small spaces left, in law, for personal moral inquiry.
Id. at 1736.
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For example, medical doctors cannot relinquish personal judgment in treating
patients, nor can they renounce personal conscience from professional work.144
They must take personal responsibility for the work they do, and may, on the
basis of ethics, refuse to enforce unjust laws.145 By contrast, lawyers and
judges, serving under the dissociation paradigm, owe no consciential
responsibility for providing professional services.
As noted earlier, professional ethics do not encourage legal professionals
to evade personal responsibility or suspend personal conscience in providing
legal services. The notion of responsibility, however, is predominantly tied to
legal knowledge, skills, and the craft of legal reasoning. Legal professionals
are responsible for preparation, diligence, competence, and other work-related
In discharging professional responsibilities, however, legal
virtues.146
professionals may consult personal conscience only if the conscience endorses
what the law dictates. Judges must follow the law regardless of their
assessment about the soundness of the law. Lawyers must defend the client’s
claims, interests, and rights regardless of personal reservations.147 By relying
on the dissociation paradigm, judges and lawyers can conclude that it is the
law they are enforcing and they have no personal responsibility if the
application of law leads to social harm.
A.

Primary Justifications

The dissociation paradigm is defended at multiple levels. The rule of law
and law-based justice are its primary justifications.148 The dissociation
paradigm safeguards the legal system against arbitrariness and distortions,
furnishing comfort to people that trained legal professionals uphold the law
even if they are personally opposed to it. Even though rarely examined, the
dissociation paradigm can also serve as an instrument to defend and preserve

144. Unfortunately, even the medical profession faces conscientic dilemmas. Doctors
experience market pressures to prescribe newer medicine and sometimes order marginal clinical
tests to safeguard against possible lawsuits. See Tara F. Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on
Defensive Medicine: A National Survey, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081 (2010).
145. “In general, when physicians believe a law is unjust, they should work to change the law.
In exceptional circumstances of unjust laws, ethical responsibilities should supersede legal
obligations.” COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §
1.02 (2008).
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010).
147. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983) (“[T]he lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client.”).
148. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Interring The Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555,
570 (2010) (commenting on testimony from senators regarding Supreme Court qualifications).
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the monopoly of Establishment.149 Unjust systems under which laws are
oppressive prescribe the dissociation paradigm as the practice guide for legal
professionals.
1.

Rule of Law

The rule of law argument is perhaps the chief defender of the dissociation
paradigm.150 The rule of law argument proceeds as follows: Lawyers and
judges must resolve disputes according to the dictates of law, which means
according to valid legal materials, such as statutes, regulations, and case
precedents. When lawyers and judges ignore the application of laws, the rule
of law is subverted. The rule of law is also undermined when lawyers and
judges apply one set of laws to one case and another set of laws to another
case, even though the two cases are similar and ought to be judged alike.
Arbitrary or selective non-application of precedents undermines the rule of
law.151 Of course, favors, special rights, exemptions, exceptions, and
numerous other devices may also be used to undermine the rule of law.
Furthermore, the rule of law demands that the morality embedded in laws
ought to be upheld. The laws are rarely morally empty.152 Most frequently,
laws carry notions of morality, even though some lawyers and some judges
may disagree with these notions. The dissociation paradigm prohibits the
undermining of the morality of laws under some contrary notions of morality.
Lawyers and judges may appeal to lawmakers to modify or repeal undesirable
laws, but until lawmakers take action, lawyers and judges must apply the
morality of laws as it is and not as it ought to be.153

149. See Lynn Berat, Essay, Courting Justice: A Call for Judicial Activism in a Transformed
South Africa, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849, 850–51 (1993) (describing judicial passivism during the
South African apartheid).
150. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 783
(1987) (“[T]he Rule of Law requires that a legal text be separated from the purpose present in the
mind of the creator of the text.”).
151. See Commonwealth v. Poundstone, 188 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (“If the
courts are to wave like wheat in the wind, the whims of the particular judges of the moment and
not rules of law will control the destinies, lives and fortunes of our people.”).
152. Even unjust laws contain the morality of the lawmakers who make such laws. Slavery
laws, for example, were not morally vacuous for slave owners, even though they were for the
slaves. See Ali Khan, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289, 326–28 (2001)
(discussing varying theories as moral justifications for the preservation of slavery and the labor
class).
153. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008) (“[J]udges perforce have
occasional—indeed rather frequent—recourse to other sources of judgment, including their own
political opinions or policy judgments, even their idiosyncrasies.”).
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Law-Based Justice

Closely related to the rule of law is the argument for law-based justice. In
pluralistic and diverse societies in which social groups adhere to different
religions, political philosophies, and notions of fairness and justice, lawyers
and judges should not be allowed to subvert the balance of competing values
achieved through representative legislation. In a democratic society when a
bill is proposed for adoption, groups with competing interests and values
attempt to influence lawmakers and strive to obtain legislation most favorable
to their respective goals and ideologies. Lawmakers, through a complex
process of political deliberation, debate competing goals. The democratic
process allows the majority of elected representatives to legislate policy
preferences, though under constraints of the constitution. Once the legislature
has opted for a law-based fairness or justice and translated its preference into a
statute, all competing notions of fairness and justice stand excluded.154 Legal
professionals must respect the democratic process and refrain from
undermining legislative preferences through lawyering or judicial process.
The dissociation paradigm thus promises to preserve law-based justice.
3.

Safeguarding Establishment

The dissociation paradigm furnishes a theoretical construct for
safeguarding the power of the Establishment. The Establishment—be it
oligarchy, clergy, military, influential families, powerbrokers, or pressure
groups—does not wish to lose its control of the state machinery.155 It employs
the state machinery to preserve its dominion over the creation, application, and
enforcement of laws.156 The dissociation paradigm serves as a powerful
instrument of exclusion as it forbids legal professionals from undermining the
laws of the Establishment. Legal professionals are welcome to join and
support the Establishment but not undermine it. Apartheid South Africa relied
on the dissociation paradigm in obligating lawyers and judges to apply the
apartheid laws regardless of their personal views of fairness and justice.157 In
Dred Scott, shortly before the eruption of the Civil War, Justice Taney
affirmed the dissociation paradigm to argue that morality and justice have

154. J. Skelly Wright, Law And The Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning, Devlin,
and Judicial Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 182 (1980) (book review).
155. See WEBSTER’S II: NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 384 (1995) (defining establishment).
Even in democracies, plutocracies, rather than the people, control power. See Dennis F.
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1058 (2005).
156. Cf. Thompson, supra note 155, at 1036 (discussing the implications of campaign
contributions).
157. Berat, supra note 149, at 850–51.
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nothing to do with application of the U.S. Constitution—a judicial effort to
preserve the race ideology of the Establishment.158
Even though judges and lawyers are frequently part of the Establishment,
the dissociation paradigm is most needed when legal professionals lose respect
for the system and when the Establishment no longer trusts legal professionals.
In democratic societies, the institutional justification for promoting the
dissociation paradigm is dressed up in philosophical theories such as the will
of the people, constitutional supremacy, and representative democracy. In
non-democratic societies, state ideology is enforced by invoking the welfare of
the people or through blatant coercion. In any system, when the Establishment
fears that legal professionals are likely to challenge laws and state ideology,
the dissociation paradigm gathers mass. In mistrusting times, the personal
conscience of legal professionals is excluded, even monitored, to preempt
subversion.159
B.

Judicial Nominees

It is customary for the Senate Judicial Committee members to give
speeches to affirm the dissociation paradigm, preaching to judicial nominees
that they must uphold the rule of law and not impose their personal social,
political, and economic views.160 Judicial nominees of all persuasions, “to one
degree or another, tell the same sort of lies.”161 The nominees state they will
respect the law, uttering some variation of the “magical words” that Robert
Bork, an unsuccessful nominee for the Supreme Court, asked judges to believe:
Judges should apply, not make, law.162 These representations to the
Committee are for the most part deceptive utterances calculated to lubricate the
confirmation process.163 These hearings perpetuate the fiction of the
158. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857), superseded by U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
159. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 993 (2009) (noting that
as part of the war on terror, Attorney General Ashcroft authorized monitoring communications
between lawyers and prisoners).
160. See, e.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?t=month&d=06-2010&p=hearings.
161. Nelson Lund, Judicial Review and Judicial Duty: The Original Understanding, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 169, 171 (2009) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY
(2008)) (questioning the scrutiny given to Justice Sotomayor’s testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee given the prevalence of similar statements in the justices’ judicial opinions).
162. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 2 (1990) (“A judge who announces a decision must be able to demonstrate that he began
from recognized legal principles and reasoned in an intellectually coherent and politically neutral
way to his result.”).
163. See Lund, supra 161, at 170–71 (describing representations made by Sonia Sotomayor).
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dissociation paradigm. Everyone in the audience and elsewhere knows that
successful nominees, particularly for the Supreme Court, would likely ignore
their statements to the Committee and decide cases as they see fit.164
Regardless of what they say to politicians, judges do make law.165
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Sonia Sotomayor’s
nomination to the United States Supreme Court brought forth a vivid defense
of the dissociation paradigm. Some members of the Committee questioned
whether Sotomayor would uphold the law regardless of her personal views.
Senator Orin Hatch reminded the audience that President Barack Obama, while
a member of the Committee, had opposed a Bush appointee to the federal
appeals court arguing “that the test of a qualified judicial nominee is whether
she can set aside her personal views.”166 Hatch added that in nominating
Sotomayor, President Obama stated that “personal empathy is an essential
ingredient in judicial decisions.”167 Hatch sought assurances that Sotomayor’s
rulings would be rooted in the law, not “personal feelings or politics.”168
Similarly, Senator Mitch McConnell demanded decisions free of “feelings or
personal or political preferences.”169 Senator Charles Grassley said Sotomayor
must “apply the law, not personal politics, feelings or preferences.”170
These reactions indicate that for some lawmakers empathy is an affront to
the dissociation paradigm. Empathy carries the discomforting idea that the
judge would bend the law and show favor for the poor, the unprivileged,
indeed for anyone that the judge sees as the underdog. The outrage against
empathy does not necessarily connote cold-heartedness, but rather a fear that
judges would begin to enforce self-righteousness, indeed their own biases, and
ignore the law.171 This fear, however, as discussed below, is contrary to the
common law tradition of consciential juries and judges.

164. See id. at 171–72.
165. See Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 545,
547 (2004) (citing, inter alia, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–9 (1980), Aharon
Barak, Foreward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 62 (2002)).
166. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
167. Id. at 12.
168. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Say it with Feeling? Not This Time Around, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2009, at A15.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Even conservative nominees are grilled over the dissociation paradigm in the Committee
hearings as some members of the Committee fear that conservative nominees might overrule
cases such as Roe v. Wade. See Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the
Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
427, 436–62 (2008) (describing the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings).
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C. Juries and Judges
Historically, common law juries were rarely subjected to the dissociation
paradigm, as they are now. Instead of controlling juries, common law
empowered juries to decide cases of law, facts, and punishment. In the
eighteenth century America, “lawyers argued fundamental law to juries, which
rendered verdicts based on their own interpretation and understanding of the
constitution.”172 Juries were not simply fact finders but decided every aspect
of the case, including points of law.173 Thus, law had a popular dimension, and
juries were trusted to understand and apply the law as they saw fit. John
Adams, an advocate of the popular power of juries, reaffirmed that it was “not
only [every juror’s] right but his Duty in that Case to find the Verdict
according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho [sic]
in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.”174 Juries were thus not
bound to the instructions that judges would give to streamline the analytical
process of jury decision making. However, as law turned to statutes and
technical craftsmanship, juries lost their powers to interpret the laws.175 Even
facts presented to juries were controlled and filtered through rules of evidence.
The historical freedom of juries to render verdicts compatible with their
personal conscience is under judicial assault.176 For a variety of reasons, the
legal system has begun to subject juries to the dissociation paradigm.177 Trial
judges do not inform juries that they have the power to nullify, a power under
which the jury returns a verdict intentionally defying the law as instructed by
the court.178 “Nullification instructions, historically common, are no longer
given. It is generally accepted that defendants have no right to such a
Although juries are losing their traditional consciential
charge.”179
prerogatives, “juror departures—when they seek to nullify the law in order to

172. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 28 (2004).
173. Id.
174. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)).
175. Id. at 164.
176. See generally Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury, “The Judicial Oligarchy”
Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379 (2007).
177. These reasons include the near extinction of traditional all-white juries, the influx of
immigrants from non-common law cultures, and the doctrinal complexity of civil and criminal
law. Id. at 387 (suggesting that “America’s ruling, wealthy, white, elite” distrusted the
“increasingly diverse jury pool”).
178. Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 485–86 (2008) (noting that some
courts dismiss jurors if the intent to nullify is discovered pre-verdict).
179. United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In his opinion,
Judge Jack B. Weinstein furnishes an erudite and historically-informed commentary on the
changing role of the juries in the United States.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

TAKING OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL OUTCOMES

917

humanize it—are far from universally frowned upon.”180 On their part, judges,
empowered with the dissociation paradigm, but conscious of jury nullification,
may give instructions asking juries to apply the law even if the law is
incompatible with their personal conscience.181
In a 2008 jury trial, U.S. District Court Judge David Coar captured the
dissociation rationale in a speech to the jury:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we all have the God given right in this
country to believe whatever we like and to make decisions as we see fit.
Outside of this courthouse and in our personal lives you can make decisions
and judge people on any basis you choose. Opinions about wealth, occupation,
political party, religious affiliation, color, race, size, sex, national origin,
whatever you think is important. As a human being I have deeply held
opinions and biases, and I suspect that you have some too. But I have taken an
oath that says as a judge I will to the very best of my ability put my stereotypes
and biases aside and decide cases on the merits, not based on my personal
182
views.

In instructing jurors to practice the dissociation paradigm and not let their
personal conscience affect the jury verdict, Judge Coar made several
observations. First, Judge Coar observed that personal views consisting of
opinions and biases constitute a state of mind that is not unique to judges but is
an essential part of human condition. Every human being has “deeply held
opinions and biases,” said the Judge.183 Implied in this observation is the
conclusion that a judge’s or a juror’s personal conscience can interfere with the
application of laws. Second, Judge Coar stated that the oath of judicial office
requires judges to put aside their personal views.184 Implied in this observation
is a belief that the oath mandates the dissociation paradigm. Under the
influence of the oath, Judge Coar believes, it is indeed psychologically possible
for judges to separate their professional self from personal conscience and put
personal opinions and biases on hold while judges hear and decide cases.185 It
is unclear whether Judge Coar believes that the dissociation skill to turn on the
professional self and turn off personal conscience can be developed through
practice and experience. Judge Coar did not claim that deeply held opinions
and biases can be (or should be) permanently disabled from judges’ and juries’
minds. The suspension of personal views is temporary and not permanent.

180. United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Kaimipono
David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2003)).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining the actions
of the district court).
182. Id. (quoting the trial court).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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After disposing of the case, judges will not breach the oath if they revert to
their personal self again.
The dissociation paradigm is not confined to trial courts. Appellate judges
are equally conscious of what they call “judicial activism,” a phrase that
dissenting judges use to criticize the majority holding of the court.186 West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Benjamin described judicial
activism as a method of decision making “[w]hen judges advance their own
notions of what they believe the law should be rather than what the law is . . .
which is disrespectful to our constitutional system of governance and which is
ultimately destructive to public confidence in the judiciary.”187 Judges who
allege that other judges engage in judicial activism frequently cite their own
example of upholding the law even when they personally disagree with the
law’s purpose or policy, thereby demonstrating that judicial restraint can
indeed be practiced as a professional skill.188
Some judges, including Supreme Court Justices, openly endorse the
dissociation paradigm in judicial opinions. Justice Holmes’ legendary dissent
in Lochner is as much about the dissociation paradigm as it is about the state
regulation of working hours in New York bakeries.189 Justice Holmes
dissented in support of the New York legislature because, in his view, the
majority had opted for free markets (laissez faire economics), even though “a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.”190
Justice Holmes raised a simple dissociation question: Should judges invalidate
democratic choices, which a state legislature makes, by reading a contrary
economic theory into the Constitution? Holmes pointed out that some judges
may personally prefer one economic theory over the other.191 Some might be
highly learned in an economic theory while others might “desire to study it
further.”192 But the knowledge or preference of judges for a certain economic
theory does not empower judges to invalidate “the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law.”193 Thus, Justice Holmes endorsed the
dissociation paradigm, at least in matters of economic ideology, arguing that

186. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 8 So. 3d 277, 283 (Ala. 2008) (Cobb, C.J.,
dissenting).
187. Eastham v. City of Huntington, 671 S.E.2d 666, 673 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J.,
concurring). For academic commentary, see for example, Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do
Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401 (2002);
Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1441 (2004).
188. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
189. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 75.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 75.
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judges cannot invalidate state statutes just because they personally disagree
with the economic theory embedded in legislative policy choices.
The dissociation paradigm is by no means a liberal or conservative
philosophy.
Liberal judges invoke the principle when it suits their
argumentation. Justice Stevens, a liberal judge, was willing to uphold federal
statutes that prescribed minimum wages and non-discrimination on the basis of
age, even though he believed that increasing “the minimum price of labor
inevitably reduces the number of jobs” and that the burdens of prohibiting a
mandatory retirement age outweigh its benefits.194 In doing so, Justice Stevens
boldly and unequivocally declared that “[m]y personal views on such matters
are, however, totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to
perform.”195 In a contested abortion case, the conservative Supreme Court
Justices accused their liberal colleagues, including Justice Stevens, of minting
“a brand new standard” to disallow the state regulation of abortion.196 “[T]he
standard will do nothing to prevent ‘judges from roaming at large in the
constitutional field’ guided only by their personal views.”197
The dissociation paradigm is not confined to readings of the Constitution.
It has also been invoked in the interpretation of statutes. In 1944, Justice Black
declared that “for judges to rest their interpretation of statutes on nothing but
their own conceptions of ‘morals’ and ‘ethics’ is, to say the least, dangerous
business.”198 Likewise, Justice Stewart upheld Texas’s procedures to enforce a
state recidivist statute, declaring that “the Constitution [has given] me [no]
roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas my own
notions of enlightened policy.”199
Personal conscience does not appear in the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.200 Judges must be independent, but judicial independence has not
been interpreted to mean that judges may subordinate laws to their personal
conscience.201 Compliance with the law, and not personal conscience, is
considered indispensable for maintaining public confidence in impartiality of
the judiciary.202 Any concession that a judge may consider personal

194. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
196. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 964 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White,
Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 944.
197. Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
198. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 673 (1944) (Black, J.,
concurring).
199. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
200. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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conscience in deciding cases is tantamount to discarding the dissociation
paradigm, the primary purpose of which is to direct judges to apply the law
even if the law conflicts with the judges’ personal values. Personal
conscience, however, has not been completely banished from judicial conduct
or legal reasoning. Judicial recusal, for example, is closely tied to personal
conscience.203 Absent legal disqualification, recusal is a matter left to the
judge’s personal conscience.204
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit stated that when writing
opinions, judges suffer from a “terrible anxiety” that they would be accused of
making decisions not on the basis of law but personal inclinations.205 To allay
this anxiety, judges anchor their reasoning in a highly complex analytical
framework of precedents and legal history, “much of it extremely phony.”206
Posner stated that judges are not necessarily geniuses and scholars, but rather
“just lawyers trying to give some reasonable grounds for their opinions.”207
D. Government Lawyers
While judges do not have to align with the government, government
lawyers defend government actions and policies. Government lawyers also
represent the interests and values of the nation and not merely those of
governments or state agencies to which they are assigned. When government
lawyers serve primarily the persons in power and subordinate personal
conscience to the interests of their political bosses, they may be called
establishment lawyers. Establishment lawyers use legal knowledge and skills
to enforce the policies of the persons in power.208 Willing to serve, the
establishment lawyers face situations where they might have to abandon
personal conscience and situations where they might also have to discard the
dissociation paradigm.209

203. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”).
204. See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200, 201–02 (N.Y. 1987); In re Zugibe v.
Bartlett, 881 N.Y.S.2d 307, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). The United States Code provides for
judicial disqualification in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006).
205. Linda Greenhouse, In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, § 7 (Book Review), at
14 (quoting Judge Richard A. Posner).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. The so-called “torture memos” attempted to legalize a policy of torture. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1,
2002) [hereinafter Bybee]. In these memos, the establishment lawyers were using legal skills and
analysis to legally fortify a policy of torturing Muslims detained for seeking information. See
Khan, supra note 41, at 599 & n.271.
209. See id. at 549.
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The United States Constitution empowers the President to “require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.”210 This Clause appears to be stating the obvious.211 Yet the Clause
highlights two important points. First, each principal officer of the executive
department is under a constitutional obligation to furnish an opinion if the
President so requires. Second, the opinion must be in writing, although
nothing prevents the President from soliciting oral opinions. Does the Opinion
Clause protect the President from liability (including impeachment) if reliance
on written opinions leads to an illegal or unconstitutional policy?212 Are
principal officers liable for political, social, and legal consequences if their
written opinions lead to an illegal or unconstitutional policy? Is the purpose of
the Opinion Clause to shift responsibility from the President to principal
officers?213
The Opinion Clause assumes frightening meaning when we read the
Torture Memos, which government lawyers drafted to defend certain
extraordinary policies and practices in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks on the United States.214 The Torture Memos were written to furnish
legal opinions to the White House Counsel and, ultimately, to the President.215
These Memos pose a set of difficult questions. Are government lawyers free
to render legal opinions without fear of civil and criminal penalties? If
government lawyers are protected for their legal opinions, are elected officials
who act upon such opinions to make policies immune from civil and criminal
penalties? If neither government lawyers nor elected officials are accountable,
how do we prevent blatantly unlawful opinions from undermining the rule of
law?
Consider the memo that Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, now a
federal judge on the Ninth Circuit, wrote in August 2002 for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President.216 The memo described Presidential

210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
211. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
212. Akhil Reed Amar, Essay, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647,
662 (1996) (arguing that the purpose was not to pass the buck from the President to principal
officers).
213. The President is under a constitutional obligation to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be
faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Opinion Clause cannot be interpreted to dilute
the Take Care Clause. See Amar, supra note 212, at 659.
214. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., for the
Files, Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo
statusolcopinions01152009.pdf.
215. See Khan, supra note 41, at 599.
216. See Bybee, supra note 208.
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powers to institute standards of conduct for interrogation of enemy combatants,
arguing that Congress cannot restrict or regulate interrogation of battlefield
combatants.217 The power to set standards for interrogation is vested in the
President as the sole custodian of the Commander-in-Chief authority.218 The
President may, the memo argued, lawfully disregard a federal criminal statute
that interferes with his powers to detain and interrogate enemy combatants.219
More specifically, the memo narrowed the definition of torture, asserting, for
example, that torture does not mean any physical injury but only serious
physical injury such as organ failure or a permanent loss of a significant body
function.220 This narrowed definition leaves out a range of acts that though
they “may amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, they do not
produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of
torture.”221
In writing this memo, it is unknown whether Bybee was upholding the
dissociation paradigm. It is possible that Bybee was writing a memo in
accordance with the law as he saw it, without personally adopting any
definition of torture or personally endorsing any aggressive interrogation
techniques. Bybee might personally have been opposed to the findings of the
memo. If so, Bybee was analyzing the law under the dissociation paradigm
and, as such, carries no personal responsibility for facilitating the subsequent
torturing of Muslim detainees. It is also possible that Bybee’s personal
approval of torture supported the findings of the memo. Any such personal
concord with the memo might have been coincidental or manipulative. The
concord was coincidental and protected under the dissociation paradigm if
Bybee made no effort to distort the legal analysis in favor of torture. However,
the concord was manipulative and not protected under the dissociation
paradigm if Bybee was coloring the legal reasoning to sanction torture in line
with his personal views. Nobody knows what Bybee was thinking when he
wrote the memo. Unless Bybee speaks honestly, these and related questions
will remain shrouded in mystery.
It is also unknown whether government lawyers, including Bybee, faced
practical arguments in assessing the laws against torture. They knew that
torture is unlawful.222 The legal reasoning derived from statutes, cases, and
treaties is overwhelming against commissioning torture.223 The assertion that
217. Id. at 2, 34–35.
218. Id. at 36–38.
219. Id. at 34–35.
220. Id. at 6.
221. Bybee, supra note 208, at 2.
222. Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006)).
223. See Jeannine Bell, Essay, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness of Torture,
83 IND. L.J. 339, 343 n.14, 344 n.15 (2008) (listing international and American statutory
prohibitions on torture).
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torture does not work and produces bad information is a well-known practical
argument against the use of torture.224 This practical argument, however, lost
traction in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.225 The opposing practical
argument that torture could produce reliable information was endorsed in the
halls of power.226 Government lawyers had a choice to make between legal
reasoning embedded in normative sources of law and the practical argument.227
They opted for the practical argument and scrapped the normative standard.
They manufactured new phrases to conceal torture and twisted legal reasoning
to allow what is manifestly prohibited under the law. Unfortunately, for most
governments, the practical argument trumps the contrary normative standard.
In such cases, government lawyers are under patriotic pressure to undermine
prescriptive standards to serve the nation (facing security threats). In such
cases, the dissociation paradigm is also discarded.
The Torture Memos demonstrate that the dissociation paradigm takes a
naïve, mechanistic view of professional mind. The dissociation paradigm
presupposes that legal professionals are psychologically capable of separating
the legal-self from practical considerations and personal pressures. The
dissociation paradigm also expects that legal professionals will indeed do so.228
The paradigm views human personality as a concoction of numerous distinct
and severable parts, which can be individually mobilized and demobilized at
will. Legal professionals are asked to demobilize emotions, ideology, and
pressures while performing legal services. They are asked to mobilize legal
knowledge and analytical skills, adhering to what law is in statutes, cases, and
regulations. The idea of selective mobilization of human intellect or what has
been called “mechanical rationalism” happily presumes that knowledge and
skills can be surgically severed from the web of the human personality and
successfully employed to engage in purely knowledge-driven legal reasoning
and decisionmaking.229 The ownership principle, discussed below, accepts no
such mechanical rationalism.
IV. OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE
The ownership principle requires legal professionals, notably lawyers and
judges, to accept connectionist responsibilities for legal services they render
224. See id. at 352–57.
225. The rejection of practical argument thus imposes informational cost on the community
since the system cannot benefit from the information that could be obtained through torture.
226. Bell, supra note 223, at 349.
227. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 354 (1997)
(distinguishing between theoretical and practical approaches to legal reasoning).
228. Maybe, some legal professionals cannot unlearn their formative consciousness and must
inject personal views and values in to the reasoning process.
229. See WILLIAM JAMES, What Psychical Research Has Accomplished, in THE WILL TO
BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 299, 323–24 (2d reprt. 1897).
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and for legal reasoning they employ to influence legal outcomes. They must
pursue in legal reasoning what Dan Simon calls “cognitive coherence.”230 The
connectionist responsibilities emanate from the intertwined domains of laws,
ethics, and personal conscience. By reasoning within the constraints of laws
and ethics, legal professionals do not renounce personal conscience. The
ownership principle holds legal professionals responsible for the reasoning
they employ in their work products, such as briefs, memorandums, oral
arguments, opinions, law review articles, and legislation. Accordingly,
whenever legal professionals render legal services, produce, or strive to
produce legal outcomes, they must own the services and the reasoning that
support legal outcomes and accept the concomitant responsibilities.231
The ownership responsibility is specific and individual; it is tied to each
legal outcome and to each legal professional. Lawyers coauthoring briefs,
judges coauthoring opinions, and professors coauthoring law review articles
are responsible individually and collectively. Sharing the production of a legal
outcome does not distribute or dilute ownership responsibilities. In shared
legal services, each participating professional is responsible as if he or she
were the sole provider of services.
The ownership principle presumes that the legal professional is an
integrated human being, pursuing cognitive coherence, not a mechanical
assembly of distinct and severable parts of legal knowledge, ethics, and
personal conscience pursuing cognitive dispersion. Mark Orkin captures it
succinctly: “A lawyer cannot, more than any other man, keep his personal
conscience and his professional conscience in separate pockets.”232 The
ownership principle recognizes that legal professionals strive to minimize
cognitive dissonance and remove ratio-moral tensions in their thoughts and
deeds. They cannot lead successful personal and professional lives if they are
internally conflicted and if they have to constantly switch on and off their
professional personality when at odds with their deeply held beliefs. While a
complete harmony with law is nearly impossible, and some intellectual and
behavioral inconsistencies are a natural part of life and perhaps even necessary
for personal development, a deliberate separation between professional and
personal selves—a separation that the dissociation paradigm requires—is
unsustainable. Ignoring the dissociation paradigm, most legal professionals
minimize cognitive dissonance using a number of conventional methods,

230. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004) (cognitive coherence merges the rational with the
critical).
231. The ownership responsibility of lawyers, judges, and lawmakers is manifest. The
ownership responsibility of law professors and law students is diffused, but no less important.
232. MARK M. ORKIN, LEGAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 264 (1957).
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including rationalization, gaming, and subversion.233 Any such minimization
of cognitive dissonance, however, does not automatically satisfy the ownership
principle. Legal professionals who experience no ratio-moral tensions in
providing legal services may still care for the approbation of peers, and act
under constraints. Even in such cases, however, the critical question remains:
Is personal conscience actively engaged with legal reasoning?
As members of an epistemic group, that provides knowledge-based legal
services to numerous sections of the society, legal professionals serve as
advocates, advisors, negotiators, evaluators, arbitrators, mediators, judges, and
law professors. In providing professional services, the singular devotion to
promoting any one set of interests is no longer the dominant professional ethic
of law practice. For lawyers, serving clients is an undertaking situated in a
complex web of responsibilities emanating from the core values of the legal
system, legal profession, and personal conscience.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct endorse a connectionist web of
responsibilities.234 In providing legal services, the lawyer is not only a
representative of clients, but the same lawyer is also an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.235 The lawyer must also be guided by “personal conscience.”236 In
representing clients, the lawyer is obligated to exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice.237 “In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s
situation.”238 The same is true for judges and law professors. Practically and
normatively, legal professionals function in a complex and intertwined domain
of prescriptive and permissive standards.
A.

Distinguishing the Ownership Principle

Several points need clarification to remove confusion that might gather
around the ownership principle. Aware of multiple responsibilities, the
ownership principle recognizes responsibility for malpractice and professional
incompetence in civil and criminal cases, but the ownership principle extends
beyond these responsibilities. Similarly, the ownership principle is closely tied
233. See David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 280, 285
(2003).
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010). These rules were adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates in 1983 and succeed the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Id. at ix–x.
235. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 233 (2004).
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2010).
237. Id. R. 2.1.
238. Id.
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to personal conscience, and yet, the principle must not be confused with selfrighteousness or willful egoism. The ownership principle recognizes selfinterest of legal professionals in making a living and striving for professional
excellence, but the principle also endorses altruism that motivates legal
professionals to subordinate self-interest to a greater cause.
1.

Malpractice and Incompetence

The ownership principle includes the responsibility for legal malpractice
and ineffective assistance.
Knowledge-based competence, well-honed
lawyering skills, care-centered conduct, meticulous preparation, and general
alertness are the professional tools of practicing lawyers.239 Ill-equipped
lawyers representing clients are responsible for engaging in legal malpractice
in civil cases and providing ineffective assistance in criminal cases.240
Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases refers to the
defense attorney’s defective performance that materially alters the outcome of
the case to the defendant’s detriment.241 Legal malpractice in civil cases may
also stem from incompetence, even though a competent lawyer may be
charged with malpractice for negligence and other irresponsible behavior that
undermines the client’s case.242 The term “legal malpractice” involves the
“failure to render professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence
that an ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar
circumstances.”243

239. The misreading or misapplication of a prior case is also a failure of legal reasoning.
“[W]here the court finds that an alleged mistake of law is the result of professional incompetence
based on erroneous advice, general ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of the rules, or
unjustifiable negligence in the research of the law,” professional malpractice is manifest. Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Glendale v. Long, 345 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(citations omitted).
240. Lawyers in criminal cases are frequently alleged to have committed legal malpractice.
See Pamela Glazner, Ethics Year in Review, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957, 990 (2006)
(examining California claims of malpractice and ineffective assistance of counsel).
241. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). This seminal capital
punishment case on the right to effective assistance of counsel has spawned massive legal
commentary debating the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Robert R.
Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007); Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping
Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard For Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
147 (2001).
242. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.1, at 4–5
(2010). For example, professional competence has been found wanting in cases where the
matrimonial attorney failed to properly assess the percentage of marital asset the client would
likely be awarded if the case went to trial. Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1305 (N.J.
1992).
243. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1044 (9th ed. 2009).
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In both civil and criminal cases, lawyers enjoy a range of professional
maneuvering.244 Trial strategies may fail for a number of reasons other than
incompetence. A tactical or even strategic failure per se does not demonstrate
incompetence.245 The ownership principle would require lawyers to accept the
legal consequences associated with incompetence and negligence. However,
the ownership principle is not confined to ineffective assistance and legal
malpractice. Competent and well-prepared lawyers cannot set aside personal
conscience in providing legal services.
2.

Self-Righteousness

The ownership principle must be distinguished from self-righteousness.
Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly remarked, “[S]elf-righteousness gives too
slender an assurance of rightness.”246 In commenting upon the judicial
misconduct of Judge Jeffrey V. Boles, the Indiana Supreme Court described
Judge Boles as “a bright, energetic, intense, aggressive, and often intimidating
advocate who is both blessed and cursed with an advanced case of selfrighteousness.”247 These qualities “can often serve substantial public good,”
the court opined, but they are not suitable for judges who must dispassionately
balance all sides presented in private disagreements.248 Self-righteous legal
professionals not only hold the belief of being absolutely right on a certain
legal matter but are unwilling to be self-critical or open to counter-viewpoints.
Personal conscience without self-criticism can lead to self-righteousness.249
The ownership principle does not endorse self-righteousness that lacks selfcriticism and is closed to learning and enlightenment.
3.

Ethical and Psychological Egoisms

Closely related to self-righteousness are behavioral dynamics of
psychological egoism and ethical egoism.250 A brief discussion of these
egoisms illuminates the differing normative foundation of the ownership
principle. The ownership principle has little in common with psychological
egoism, and the two must never be confused. Conceptually related to
utilitarianism, psychological egoism explains that individuals indeed act to
maximize their own interest, welfare, pleasure, or utility, even if told
244. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
245. See, e.g., Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that decision to
exclude former client’s employer in original lawsuit not legal malpractice as a matter of law).
246. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
247. In re Boles, 555 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (Ind. 1990).
248. Id.
249. See supra Part III.B.
250. For an introductory understanding of ethical egotism, see Edward Regis, Jr., What is
Ethical Egoism?, 91 ETHICS 50 (1980).
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otherwise. Thomas Hobbes championed psychological egoism in his political
and legal theories.251 The actual pursuit of self-interest, including selfishness,
is the core attribute of psychological egoism, arguably rooted in human nature.
Critics point out that an extreme version of psychological egoism could lead
one to be a “dismal self-seeking brute.”252 Rogue lawyers have been accused
of lying and deception to aggregate personal utility, a conduct that might fall
under psychological egoism. These lawyers, however, breach and not affirm
the normative standards of professional conduct.
Ethical egoism, in its rudest form, has been defined as a moral doctrine
under which persons ought to care only for themselves.253 As explained by
Ramon Lemos, who coined the term psychological egoism, ethical egoism is a
prescriptive doctrine, whereas psychological egoism is a descriptive
phenomenon.254 Ethical egoism is a prescriptive doctrine that urges persons to
maximize their self-interest, even if they do not want to. It does not assume
that individuals are indeed psychologically predisposed to maximize selfinterest at all costs. A more nuanced version of ethical egoism implicates that
a person’s internal sense of right and wrong, including self-interest, supplies
reasons for holding beliefs, making decisions, and taking actions.255 In this
sense, ethical egoism perhaps overlaps the concept of personal conscience.
Both psychological and ethical egoisms are contrary to the ownership
principle, because legal professionals must diligently manage legal affairs of
others, though they are compensated for professional services. Lawyers cannot
accumulate personal gains by sacrificing the client’s interests, ignoring laws,
and breaching professional ethics. Ethical egoism, however, may share some
elements with the ownership principle, since under both concepts legal
professionals would make decisions and act according to consciential
convictions. Even in this similarity, however, a significant distinction remains.
In ethical egoism, no other truth or moral code or laws but the person’s internal
prescriptions are the drivers of judgment and action. The ownership principle
cannot be reduced to a personal code of convictions. Legal professionals
render conscientious service within the context of laws and professional ethics.
In the intertwined realm of law, ethics, and personal conscience, no legal

251. F.S. McNeilly, Egoism in Hobbes, 16 PHIL. Q. 193, 193 (1966). But see Bernard Gert,
Hobbes and Psychological Egoism, 28 J. HIST. IDEAS 503, 503 (1967) (arguing Hobbes’s work
was incompatible with theories of egoism).
252. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEM OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956–1972,
at 251 (1973).
253. See D. Goldstick, Refutation of “Ethical Egoism”, 34 ANALYSIS 38, 38 (1973).
254. Ramon M. Lemos, Psychological Egoism, 20 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 540,
540–41 (1960).
255. Ethical egoism is a prescriptive doctrine that urges persons to maximize their selfinterest, even if they do not want to. It does not assume that individuals are psychologically
predisposed to maximize self-interest at all costs. Id. at 541.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

TAKING OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL OUTCOMES

929

professional is permitted to render professional services strictly under the
dictates of any form of egoism.256
4.

Self-Interest

The ownership principle is not opposed to self-interest. The principle
allows charging fees, even significant fees, for legal services. Pleadings,
motions, briefs, contracts, and other legal texts are drafted for monetary
compensation. Judges are compensated for judicial services, including writing
opinions. Academic writings too have a monetary dimension. Few products
involving law or legal reasoning are written for aesthetic, altruistic, or nonmonetary purposes. The nexus between legal services and money is not
inherently offensive, nor is it a source of shame for the legal profession. Like
medical and accounting services, legal services cannot be delivered without
compensation.257 The cost of legal services is related to the complexity of
research and legal analysis. Hard cases and innovative transactions are more
expensive than routine legal services.
Professor Gillian Hadfield makes an impressive argument that “[t]he price
of legal services, as determined by a market for lawyers in a market
democracy, increases as legal human capital accumulates, specialization
becomes more extensive, and law becomes more complex as it adapts.”258
Two distinct factors increase the price of legal services: quantity and
complexity of legal materials. When a huge body of legal materials consisting
of statutes, cases, and regulations is critical for understanding, interpreting, and
resolving factual and legal issues, sifting through the sheer quantity of law
requires intellectual labor and a higher level of competence. The rigor of legal
analysis becomes even more demanding when legal materials are complicated
or convoluted. Legal materials can be dense due to inept drafting and inherent
tedium of the subject matter. The compounded effect of quantity and
complexity compels specialization, creating market pockets in select areas of
law as fewer lawyers invest the needed personal and intellectual resources to
develop and maintain the requisite competence. Such market pockets increase
the price of legal services.259
While recognizing the complex markets of legal services, the ownership
principle does not demand that legal professionals set aside self-interest, nor
256. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1143–44
(2009) (discussing egoisms in the context of adversarial practice).
257. Lawyers invest huge sums of money, mostly borrowed as interest-bearing student loans,
for obtaining legal education. They have professional and practical reasons to charge fees for
legal services they provide to clients.
258. Gillian K. Hadfield, Don’t Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the
Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 418 (2007).
259. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 964–65 (2000).
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does it require that they pursue self-interest. The ownership principle allows
for altruism and working for the benefit of the poor and the powerless in the
community. Legal professionals who devote their legal talents to serve pro
bono causes act as much under the ownership principle as do others who use
law as a means of accumulating personal wealth.260 Some legal professionals
provide legal services just to maximize self-interest and in doing so abandon
personal conscience, cut corners with ethics, and subvert laws. The
maximization of self-interest by any means necessary profoundly offends the
ownership principle.
B.

Synthetic Consciousness

Personal conscience, an important normative component of the ownership
principle, is a dynamic entity that changes, develops, and matures as legal
professionals gain legal knowledge and understand professional ethics.261 Law
students, for example, initiate their law studies with notions of personal
morality, fairness, and justice. The study of law reinforces some of their
personal notions while it challenges others. Many law students undergo a
transformation of consciousness during the course of legal studies. Some leave
the law school with a highly modified personal conscience.262 Others continue
to retain some notions of morality, fairness, and justice that are not fully
compatible with laws. The tension between legal education and personal
conscience is inevitable, and the two rarely fuse to become one permanently.263
The active interaction between law and personal conscience does not end upon
graduation from the law school. It continues as long as legal professionals are
engaged in rendering legal services. Lawyers, judges, law professors, and
other legal professionals continue to develop personal conscience in complex
ways. Some legal professionals may actively strive to fuse personal views
with laws thereby creating a synthetic consciousness, while some may partition
their consciousness between personal and professional domains.
The ownership principle does not make the herculean demand that legal
professionals develop synthetic consciousness with respect to each and every
point of law. No legal professional can possibly endorse each and every aspect
of the legal system. In a complex legal system, laws incorporate multiple

260. Some lawyers may provide pro bono services to gain experience that they can later use
to serve paying clients.
261. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178 (1989) (admitting that his views on jurisprudence have changed over time).
262. Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training and Placing Public Interest Law
Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1566 (2002) (noting that students lose public interest
commitment during law school).
263. Joshua E. Perry, Thinking Like a Professional, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 159, 164 (2008)
(arguing that students must strive to avoid the detachment of personal from professional).
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visions and values. Some legal professionals may advocate a robust right to
freedom of speech but oppose the right to abortion. Some may endorse the
individual right to bear arms but may wish to suppress hate speech. Some may
argue that public schools should teach the Biblical view of creation along with
the Darwinian conception of evolution. Even in a specific area of law, legal
professionals may agree with some laws but not with others. In family law, for
example, legal professionals may sincerely disagree over such fundamental
issues as the definition of marriage. Amidst a thousand points of conflict, legal
professionals cannot develop a synthetic consciousness in complete harmony
with laws as they exist at any given time. Accordingly, the ownership
principle does not demand that legal professionals either own or disown each
and every piece of law.
Seasoned legal professionals who invest intellectual resources and
accumulate practical experience in legal niches may be positioned to develop
synthetic consciousness. Lawyers are free to choose the area of law that
matches their values and interests. Except for early in the career, when some
fresh law graduates may not find jobs of their liking, most legal professionals
are unlikely to continue to practice in areas of law that offend their deeply held
values. Legal professionals gravitate both toward law practices that they enjoy
and with respect to topics they find morally comfortable.264 Given the variety
of legal jobs, most attorneys can choose an area of law that suits their personal
conscience.
The ownership principle exerts connectionist influence on legal
professionals. It modifies their personal conscience to bring it in harmony with
laws and provides critical perspective on laws that cannot be reconciled with
personal conscience. This kinetic interaction between laws and personal
conscience that the ownership principle generates sharpens personal
responsibility. Experts heavily invested in specific fields of law develop
sophisticated understandings of the law. They not only know what the law is,
but they also know how the law ought to be improved.265 In small ways, legal
professionals may even strive to change the law and bring it in conformity with
their personal conscience. Sometimes changes are revolutionary. In 1954,
Thurgood Marshall and a committed team of lawyers persuaded the United
States Supreme Court to overturn racial segregation laws that had been
protected under the Constitution.266

264. This may not be true for lawyers in a tough job market or in areas where law practice
offers fewer subject matter opportunities.
265. Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of
Public Nuisance, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 613, 623 n.6 (1998) (noting that seasoned lawyers may
take cases when they expect the court decision to result in legal change).
266. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See also David L. Faigman, Defining
Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus
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C. Responsibility for Legal Services
Among legal professionals, lawyers are well positioned to take the
ownership principle seriously as they can choose to practice in any area of law
that does not offend their personal conscience. They can find cases to promote
social and economic causes consistent with their personal sense of justice and
morality. Activist lawyers belong to all shades of political ideologies,
championing diverse and sometimes diametrically opposing causes and
agendas.267 Liberal activist lawyers pursue left-of-center causes, whereas
conservative activist lawyers advocate right-of-center agendas.268 Even causeoriented lawyers practicing law in areas of personal commitment may find it
hard to completely agree with the interests, tactics, and behavior of their
clients.269 No lawyer imposes her own solutions on the client regardless of the
client’s wishes. Likewise, not every wish of the client may receive the
lawyer’s support. Some separation from clients is inevitable and perhaps
healthy for all parties involved.
While codes of professional responsibility have moved away from an
emphasis on zealous advocacy toward a more balanced idea of professional
responsibility, realities of the market may force lawyers to suspend conscience
and the concomitant ownership principle and embrace a more practical
attitude.
Clients demand exclusive loyalty from lawyers and prefer
representation unaffected by lawyers’ personal values. Dictated by realities of
the market, lawyers may accept cases that violate their personal conscience.
Lawyers struggling to support their families and to pay off hefty student loans
may ill-afford to choose cases that their conscience freely approves. They
know that if they decline personally uncomfortable cases, there are plenty of
lawyers willing to take those cases and the fees. In many cases, therefore, fees
may override conscience. A fee-driven market may promote the dissociation
paradigm under which legal professionals practice law divorced from personal
conscience.

Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 631–32 (2009)
(discussing Marshall’s preparation for overturning the constitutional segregation doctrine).
267. Compare William C. Duncan, Speaking Up For Marriage, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
915 (2009) (defending the traditional concept of marriage as between man and woman), with Chai
R. Feldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 139 (2005) (arguing in favor of marriage equality).
268. For a history of the emergence of liberal and conservative activist lawyers, see STEVEN
M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
269. Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 433, 448 (1996) (stating that representing a civil-disobedience client can be
difficult, because the lawyer’s success requires both identifying with the client and obeying the
legal system’s strictures).
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Adversarial Model

The dissociation paradigm—rather than the ownership principle—seems to
dictate the dynamics of the adversarial model under which opposing attorneys
tell their clients’ story through pleadings, versions of evidence, and clientfavoring arguments to an impartial jury.270 Few would dispute that opposing
attorneys present the case not in accordance with any neutral or objective
principles but from the client’s viewpoint. Each attorney is “biased” in
promoting interests of the represented client. Each attorney would emphasize
pieces of evidence and arguments of law that best promote the client’s case.
This professional bias from each side is tolerated on the theory that a neutral
judge and an impartial jury would see through the bias and choose a legally
defensible outcome from among the competing versions of the case presented
through litigation.271 Thus, the litigation model exonerates contesting
attorneys from personal responsibility if they are promoting the client’s case
within the bounds of law and professional ethics.
In litigation, contesting lawyers must embrace the cause of their client.272
They must believe in what they are saying and doing, even if they do not agree
with the cause of their client. Lawyers must fake sincerity even when they are
internally conflicted and experiencing ratio-moral tensions or cognitive
dissonance. This will to deceive the judge and the jury is part of the job
description of a successful litigator. Deception in the courtroom requires
lawyers to be perfect actors. Critics, however, argue that judges and juries can
see through deception and feigned sincerity and that lawyers cannot succeed in
persuading a judge or jury into something they themselves do not believe.273
Litigation frequently stems from past legal events, such as a tort, breached
contract, or violated constitutional right. If the client suffered undeserved
harm, the lawyer can empathize with the client; in such cases rarely would the
lawyer experience ratio-moral tensions between the client’s case and the
lawyer’s conscience. Remedying an undeserved wrong is part of the personal

270. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (stating that ineffective
assistance of counsel can so undermine the adversarial process as to produce unjust outcomes).
271. See Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV.
357, 367–68 (2010) (“[The Federal Rules of Evidence] do not demand that lawyers take any
particular steps to support or attack witness’ credibility. It is assumed that the nature of the
adversarial process provides the necessary inducement.”).
272. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Candor Versus Advocacy: Courts’ Use of Sanctions to Enforce
the Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1995) (quoting MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 (1983) (highlighting the attorney’s duty to “zealously”
represent the client).
273. Cf. id. at 1049–50 (describing the increased use of sanctions by judges to solicit candor
from lawyers).
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conscience of lawyers.274 Difficulty arises when the client is seeking an
undeserved remedy or, worse, when the client has perpetrated a wrong that the
lawyer must defend. In defending the client’s legal interests embedded in past
events, the lawyer cannot undo the harm that the client might have perpetrated.
The lawyer need not deny the wrong that the client has committed. However,
the lawyer must protect the client from undue penalties and punishments.
2.

Advising and Settlement

The ownership principle can function more effectively when lawyers
advise clients.275 Lawyers do not advise clients to commit crimes or civil
wrongs, for any such advice holds the lawyer responsible as an accomplice and
a wrongdoer.276 In such cases, personal responsibility turns into a crime or
civil liability. Few lawyers would cross such a threshold. As noted above,
advising clients is a huge part of professional services. Advising is frequently
about present and future family and business matters. Lawyers manage and
structure significant parts of individual and corporate life.277 Even during
litigation, lawyers are advising clients about merits and demerits of settlement
and about numerous other developments that affect the clients’ present and
future interests. In their role as advisers, the ownership principle requires
lawyers to speak the truth, stay intact with personal conscience, and render the
best advice that is consistent with law and that will minimize future disputes.
Likewise, the ownership principle requires lawyers to settle disputes in the
realm of honesty and fairness.278 Since an overwhelming majority of civil and
criminal cases are settled (or plea-bargained) rather than fully litigated,279
lawyers have more opportunities in rendering legal services consistent with the
ownership principle. In proposing a reachable settlement, the lawyer must not

274. After receiving legal education, few lawyers would hold that undeserved wrongs must
not be compensated, although they might disagree over the definition of an undeserved wrong.
275. See Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
225, 228–29 (2006) (arguing that the lawyer’s personal moral convictions cannot be severed from
attorney-client discourse).
276. Firpo v. United States, 261 F. 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1919) (“To advise a client to commit an
act which is a crime makes the lawyer an accomplice, and at common law he would be an
accessory.”). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010) (“A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent . . . .”).
277. Lawyers, for example, write wills, manage estates, propose and execute tax strategies,
draw contracts, effect commercial transactions, and assist in the adoption of children.
278. See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 2.1 (2002) (Sec’n of
Litigation, ABA); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031, 1136–37 (1975).
279. See Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664 (2001).
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deceive the client.280 The client must freely consent to the terms of the
settlement. However, most clients are deferential to their lawyers and give
serious consideration to terms of settlement that the lawyers recommend.
Thus, while conventional rhetoric paints the lawyer as the client’s mouthpiece
in settlement conferences, the reality is much more complex. In actuality, the
lawyer and the client might be (or should be) engaged in a more interactive
relationship. If lawyers are competent and conscientious on both sides, the
settlement is rarely a rip-off against any party. Attorneys aiming at unjust
deals rarely succeed in serving their clients well. Competent and conscientious
lawyers reach for just settlements that benefit clients, work in reality, and do
not deceive the opposing party.281
Generally, therefore, lawyers have little excuse for providing advice and
settlement services under the dissociation paradigm. They must not suspend
personal conscience to increase billable hours, lie to clients, or deceive
opponents. Assertive clients may want to use lawyers as instruments for their
transactions. They may desert lawyers who filter the client’s interests through
notions of truthfulness and fairness.
D. Fusion Prerogative
The fusion prerogative is the institutional power of certain privileged legal
professionals to apply the ownership principle. By merging professional- and
personal-selves and by refusing to authenticate their separation, these
privileged professionals need not practice the dissociation paradigm. The
fusion prerogative empowers legal professionals to render legal services from
an integrated-self. The fusion prerogative mitigates the need for gaming since
legal professionals acting from an integrated-self need not use reasoning as a
mask or subterfuge to hide their conscience or values.
It is in this context that Justice Blackmun made the connectionist response
to my assertion that he sees no distinction between what the law is and how the
law ought to be understood.282 In responding to my legal positivist question,

280. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 759–60 (1990)
(recommending that law firms create an environment where deception and lies to clients are not
tolerated). See also ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 3.1.4 cmt. (2002)
(Sec’n of Litigation, ABA) (“The duty to keep the client informed respecting settlement
discussions is an inherent component of the responsibility to let clients make ultimate
determinations respecting the objectives of the representation.”).
281. Cf. Henry Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model: Moderating Power
Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1296 (2003) (“[T]he lawyer who recommends courses of action
to her clients that produce distributional fairness may be serving the client better than those who
encourage and legitimate exploitation of power advantages.”).
282. In 1986, when Justice Harry Blackmun visited Washburn University School of Law, I
asked him this question: “In deciding cases, do you ever consider the distinction between what
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Justice Blackman was authenticating the ownership principle under which he,
as a decision maker for the United States Supreme Court, interprets laws and
the Constitution without experiencing ratio-moral tensions or cognitive
dissonance. He was under no cognitive pressure to game the system or engage
in intellectual dishonesty, and he had no need to separate his personal
understandings from his professional understandings of laws.
1.

Hierarchy of Judges

In a free and independent judiciary, high courts are institutionally
privileged to exercise the fusion prerogative.283 For example, the United States
Supreme Court is free to interpret the Constitution and overrule past
precedents.284 Supreme Court Justices interpret the Constitution, laws, cases,
and regulations according to their personal ideologies. Even though some
Justices swing in their ideology, many others are firmly committed to
advancing their personal jurisprudential views and policy preferences. Justices
need not split their mind into two and agonize over the contrived dichotomy.
The ideological warfare at the Supreme Court is most noticeable because
Justices do not hide their personal views and rarely apply the law contrary to
personal views and values. Because Justices are free to practice their personal
views of law, great controversies and political battles are fought over their
nomination and confirmation processes. The fusion prerogative claims that
legal professionals analyze problems using an ownership mind in which there
exists a complex connectionist web of laws, ethics, and personal conscience.
A weaker form of the fusion prerogative might also be available to trial
courts. Functioning at the bottom of judicial hierarchy, trial courts work under
the burdens of all the courts above them. One might argue that they are the
most institutionally handicapped to exercise the fusion prerogative. While it is
true that trial courts must apply the rules articulated in upper level courts, trial
courts have the most power to interpret the admission and weight of facts.
Although procedures and appellate review restrain the discretion of trial courts
in admitting and weighing evidence, trial courts continue to enjoy great powers
in deciding cases under the ownership principle. A small minority of cases are
appealed.285 Furthermore, standards of review are frequently deferential to the
law is and what law ought to be?” Justice Blackmun replied in the negative. Interview with
Harry Blackmun, United States Supreme Court Justice, in Topeka, Kan. (1986).
283. Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that unless on the highest state court, judges have a duty to follow mandatory
precedent, the applicable statutory laws and the Constitution, rather than their personal views).
284. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2008) (stating that the Court has the power
to overrule precendents).
285. For example, during the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2010, there were
359,594 criminal and civil cases filed in United States district courts; in that same period, only
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findings of trial courts.286 Knowing the functioning of the court system, trial
judges need not abandon the ownership principle. They may not have the
fusion prerogative working in their favor, but they have tremendous power to
shape the nuances of the trial.
It might be argued that intermediate appellate courts might be in the worst
institutional position to exercise the fusion prerogative. Unlike trial courts,
they have limited powers to interpret the facts of the case in a radically
different manner.287 They must reckon with facts as they find them in the
record. In matters of law, they have no institutional privilege to override
Supreme Court precedents. They are thus sandwiched between the proverbial
rock and a hard place, that is, between facts from the trial court and law from
the Supreme Court. Although they have some wiggle room at both ends not to
divorce themselves from the ownership principle, they might be hard pressed
to tilt toward the dissociation paradigm. Yet, some intermediate appellate
courts are known for their daring exercise of the fusion prerogative and decide
cases in ways that other intermediate courts do not even attempt.288
2.

Lawmakers

Lawmakers are in the most privileged position to exercise the fusion
prerogative. In making laws, they need not separate their professional-selves
from their personal-selves, nor do they need to engage in deceptive reasoning
in defending, opposing, or supporting a piece of legislation under
consideration. They can vote with their conscience every time a proposed bill
is on the floor of the legislature. In a democratic system under which
lawmakers are elected, the lawmakers are accountable to their constituencies.
A lawmaker who consistently acts contrary to the wishes of the electorate may
not get reelected. If a lawmaker is responsive to their constituency or wishes
to be reelected, the lawmaker may have to embrace the dissociation paradigm.

56,790 appeals were filed in the United States Courts of Appeals. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2010 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
2010/front/IndicatorsMar10.pdf.
286. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, And Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 233, 240 (2009).
287. See id. at 239.
288. The Ninth Circuit enjoys the reputation for being overly-assertive and independent, even
to the extent of defiance of the United States Supreme Court. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, Does the Supreme Court Hate the Ninth Circuit?: A Dialogue On Why That Appeals Court
Fares So Poorly, FINDLAW’S WRIT (Apr. 19, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/2002
0419.html. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is reversed at approximately the same rate as
other circuits).
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The lawmaker may vote for a bill that the constituency prefers even though the
lawmaker is personally opposed to it.
In addition to voters’ pressure, lawmakers may not exercise the fusion
prerogative for several other reasons. If a lawmaker must raise monies for
reelection, resourceful groups demand favorable legislation as a quid pro quo
for monies given to campaigns.289 The lawmaker may thus be compelled to
separate personal views and values and vote for a bill that pleases his sponsors.
The lawmaker may also be under party pressure to vote for bills that the party
leadership promotes.290 Even though lawmakers are under no legal obligation
to vote with the party, the party pressure is a political reality that few
lawmakers can resist on a continual basis. In reality, therefore, lawmakers in a
complex democratic system are under numerous conflicting pressures of
constituents, contributors, and party leaders. Facing these forces, lawmakers
cannot always exercise the fusion prerogative.
V. THE ART OF GAMING
This part argues that under the combined effect of the dissociation
paradigm and ownership principle, legal professionals have developed the art
of gaming. Gaming occurs when legal professionals, perhaps to minimize
ratio-moral tensions and the associated discomfort of cognitive dissonance,
portray personal preferences as the inescapable consequence of law and legal
reasoning.291 When legal professionals cannot openly embrace the ownership
principle, particularly when they disagree with the letter and spirit of specific
laws, they, in order to comply with the dissociation paradigm, resort to gaming
and use legal reasoning as a subterfuge to implement personal preferences.292
For example, judges could pretend that the legal outcome in a case is the
inevitable result of legal reasoning even though they know that they could have
produced a different and even opposite legal outcome with alternative legal
reasoning within the domain of valid laws.293

289. See Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How The Courts Have Employed Bogus
Jurisprudence To Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended For Individuals, 28
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 571–72 (2010) (documenting significant campaign contributions of
healthcare companies to members of Congress who opposed health care reforms).
290. See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 247 (2005) (stating that many
legislators do not even read the bills and that their votes are based on party pressures and
campaign contributions).
291. See John Gava, Dixonian Strict Legalism, Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring and
Contracting in the Real World, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 519, 524 (2010).
292. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 817 (1935) (cloaking economic prejudice as legal logic).
293. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 204 (1984).
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Since the legal system demands that legal opinions and decisions be cast in
the form of legal reasoning, legal professionals develop the art of gaming. For
gaming professionals, therefore, legal reasoning is no more than an exterior
layer placed over personal preferences. Gaming professionals adopt the
dissociation paradigm as a ruse, pretending that the legal analysis has
determined the legal outcome.294 Gaming also undermines the ownership
principle because gaming professionals deny that their personal conscience has
dictated the legal outcome.
Denying personal responsibility, gaming
professionals undermine both the dissociation paradigm and the ownership
principle. In some cases, gaming professionals use the legal apparatus to
deceive the intended audience and are fully aware of the nature of the
deception.295
Subversion shares elements with gaming, though subversion is a
fundamental negation of law whereas gaming tinkers with the law without
throwing it away.296 Subversion is thus a more severe form of gaming. Some
legal professionals subvert the law to placate personal conscience. Even in
subversion, legal professionals pay lip service to the dissociation paradigm and
pretend that law dictates the outcome.297 Subversion, though a threat to the
integrity of laws, may or may not be offensive to notions of justice.
For example, legal professionals determined to subvert discrimination laws
may undermine the system but console themselves that they are serving a
greater good and paving the way for the demise of oppression. Subversion,
however, may also undercut what others consider to be fair and just laws.
Subversion for the sake of subversion is rare. Whether subversion is good or
bad is a value judgment and often relies on the facts and circumstances of the
subversion. In subverting laws, lawyers and judges may render services
consistent with their personal conscience. Legal professionals may face
exacting sanctions, including prison time, if they subvert laws without
successfully hiding subversion under the dissociation paradigm.

294. See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial
Politics Scholarship And Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 241–42 (2009)
(discussing the false belief that legal analysis is objective).
295. See, e.g., Isaac Franklin Russell, The Indian Before the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 328, 333
(1909) (describing the use of laws to strip rights from Native Americans).
296. In ancient traditions, intellectuals were viewed with suspicion because the very concept
of reasoning was associated with subversion. C. DELISLE BURNS, GREEK IDEALS: A STUDY OF
SOCIAL LIFE 35 (Haskell House Pub., 2d ed. 1974) (1917). In the modern legal tradition,
however, legal reasoning is both respected and viewed with suspicion. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580,
2591 (2006) (noting the attack on legal reasoning by modern legal realists).
297. See, e.g., THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAW, 1849–1970, at
277 (Richard Bardolph ed., 1970) (noting how critics decried Brown v. Board of Education as
“sociological jurisprudence” and “subversion of the Constitution”).
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Secrecy of Gaming

Gaming in most cases is a personal secret. Only the conformer of the art
knows that he or she is gaming.298 The legal professional adopts a line of
reasoning to support a legal outcome but knows that the reasoning is
intellectually unsound or that it does not comply with laws. Gaming cloaks
personal views in conventional reasoning. The gaming professional uses cases
and statutes to offer arguments that support the outcome. On the surface
nothing appears to be out of order, yet the professional knows that reasoning is
a cloak rather than a determinative factor. Aware of gaming, the legal
professional knows that legal reasoning can, with equal force, lead to a
different or even an opposite outcome. In fact, the gaming professional may
concede in his own mind that the weight of authority, or a more credible
interpretation of past precedents and statutes, does not support the
professional’s personal views. Yet, the professional games the process of
reasoning, believing for a host of reasons, ranging from noble sentiments for
justice to questionable motives, that the professional’s views ought to dictate
the outcome of the matter under consideration.299 Unless the legal professional
confesses, the gaming remains a personal secret. In some cases, astute readers
and perceptive listeners might be able to sense that the professional is gaming
the process of legal reasoning. However, since ad hominem attacks are no
longer part of respectable discourse, accusations of gaming are
circumscribed.300
Legal professionals, particularly judges and law administrators, rarely
reveal the actual grounds underlying their decisions.301 They employ legal
reasoning to mask hidden agendas, including prejudice, bias, ideology, and
personal views. Gaming professionals manipulate legal reasoning for desired
legal outcomes. It is similar—although not the same—to the concept of
rationalization studied in psychology to explain the behavior of persons who
use logic and reasoning to justify decisions, acts, or beliefs prompted by
different mental processes. Rationalization is the mental processes that
justifies a decision, action, or belief.302 Rationalization can be as much self298. But see Wayne Brazil, Professionalism and Misguided Negotiating, in THE
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 697, 706 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2006) (alluding to the ability of judges to detect some overt manipulations of the judicial system).
299. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 292, at 817 (“[L]egal reasoning on the subject of trade
names is simply economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal logic.”).
300. Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 739
(2004).
301. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78
B.U. L. REV. 747, 761 (1998).
302. Eugene H. Sloane, Rationalization, 41 J. PHIL. 12, 12 (1944). Ernest Jones, who first
used “rationalization” in this context, did not confine the term to any mental pathology, but
supported the broader meaning of the term to include “justification for our opinions and theories
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deceptive as it can be other-deceptive.303 By contrast, gaming is a fantasy that
cheats only the other participants in the system. In some cases, rationalization
is an after-thought rather than a pre-thought to defend a course of action.304
Gaming is a pre-thought, deliberate, rationalization of decisions and conduct
prompted not strictly by law but also by other considerations including the call
of personal conscience. In gaming, legal professionals may profess to be
applying the law but know that they are manipulating the law to obtain desired
outcomes.
In theory, legal reasoning determines legal outcomes, positions, actions,
and judgments. Legal reasoning is associated with good faith intellectual
efforts to reach sound decisions by discarding extraneous considerations.305
Even when legal reasoning draws on other disciplines such as sociology or
economics, it remains anchored in legal sources. Legal reasoning connotes the
positive power of law.306 By contrast, gaming connotes negativity and is
associated with bad faith rationalization to construct and defend positions,
decisions, and actions.307 Gaming converts psychological factors (that
motivate legal professionals) into normative elements derived from law.308
The conversion is fraudulent. Despite these differences, it is difficult, in
reality, to determine whether a legal professional is engaged in gaming or
sincere legal reasoning.
Gaming as a secret art flourishes when the legal system supplies vast
normative space within which legal decisions may be made. The 5-4 Supreme
Court decisions309 testify to the existence of vast normative space within which
legal professionals, lawyers and judges, relying on the same legal materials,
can advocate and reach differing and in some cases opposite legal outcomes.

as well as for our conduct.” Id. (citing ERNEST JONES, Rationalization in Everyday Life, in
PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (3d ed. 1923)). Jones read that seminal paper at the First
International Psychoanalytical Congress in Salzburg on April 27, 1908. Id. at 12 n.1.
303. ROBERT AUDI, PRACTICAL REASONING 173 (1989).
304. MORRIS R. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH 216 (Felix Cohen ed.,
1954).
305. See Khan, supra note 5, at 269 (Professor Delaney advises first-year law students to
avoid injecting “extraneous notions of morality, justice or fairness” when analyzing a case).
306. See id. (quoting J. DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING 2 (rev. ed. 1987)
(“Professor Delaney prefers to familiarize first-year students to positivist legal consciousness by
having them ‘read, think, talk and write like a lawyer, not like a philosopher, ethicist, economist,
sociologist, researcher or politician.’”). Here, by positive power I mean the power of legal
reasoning to shape outcomes.
307. For example, an employer may dismiss an employee for race-based reasons but would
rarely admit to doing so. The employer would most likely offer a reason acceptable under antidiscriminations laws, such as poor job performance. Thus, the employer is engaging in gaming.
308. See Gava, supra note 291, at 524.
309. For a detailed analysis of these decisions, see Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts:
5–4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667 (1993).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

942

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:887

When legal reasoning is susceptible to variant interpretations, legal
professionals are free to implement personal preferences under the cover of
objective laws. Critical legal theorists have exposed the vulnerability of laws
and legal reasoning to the art of gaming.310 Radical criticisms might take the
position that law is simply irrelevant because smart and skillful legal
professionals can always find a way to translate personal preferences into
respectable legal reasoning without revealing the secrets of their hearts.311
The incantation of magical phrases312 with art and sophistication is part of
secretive gaming. The magical phrases of law are both real and unreal.
Lawyers rely on magical phrases to empower competing versions of stories,
hoping that decision makers will be influenced in their favor. Judges express
doubts about magical phrases that lawyers invoke to achieve litigation goals.
Commenting on the right of public employees to go on strike, for example, the
Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice disagreed with the notion that a strike by
public employees is a strike against the sovereignty of the government.313
“The conflict of real social forces cannot be solved by the invocation of
magical phrases like “sovereignty.”314 In other cases, judges sought to think
beyond magical phrases such as “a blank sheet,”315 “notice,”316 or “opportunity
to respond.”317
Ironically, judges themselves use magical phrases to legitimize opinions.
Magical phrases such as “due process,” “strict scrutiny,” “best interests of the
child,” and numerous others in every field of law evoke powers to legitimize
decisions and support conforming narratives. No narrative bereft of magical
phrases is considered respectable or creditworthy.318 Legal realists319 have
made this point with utmost clarity.320

310. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing how different rhetorical modes influence substantive legal
problems); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784 (1983) (noting that judges are political actors
motivated by their own interests and proposing that constitutional theory developed, in part, as a
restraint on those motivations).
311. STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 191 (1985).
312. “Due process of law,” “strict scrutiny,” and “unconscionability,” for example, are
magical phrases that lawyers and judges use to legitimize their respective narratives.
313. Anderson Fed’n of Teachers Local 519 v. Sch. City of Anderson, 251 N.E.2d 15, 20
(Ind. 1969) (DeBruler, C.J., dissenting).
314. Id.
315. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. NLRB, 89 F.3d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1996).
316. Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 332 (9th Cir. 1995).
317. Id.
318. For example, the landmark desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), has been criticized for its lack of legal rooting and its reliance on sociology. See
JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
TROUBLED LEGACY 68 (2001).
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Magical phrases inscribed in legal texts may draw legitimacy from a
democracy that confers powers on elected officials to enact laws and invent the
magical phrases of law. The Constitution, the ultimate treasury of law, is the
supreme text of magical phrases.321 Magical phrases adorned in Supreme
Court cases draw legitimacy from the majesty of the Court and its occupants.
Magical phrases found in scholarly works draw legitimacy from the
intellectual power of the academy gifted with time and resources to imagine,
reflect, synthesize, and critique legal ideas. Each magical phrase has its own
impressive origin, history, catalogue of achievements, and a sacred station in
the magic house. Some phrases are, of course, more powerful than others.322
Magical phrases are repeated over decades in countless instances. Their
authenticity is rooted in sophisticated theories of normative legitimacy. On the
totem pole, some magical phrases are etched higher than others. Some fall out
of grace,323 while some stand the vicissitudes of time.324
In legal reasoning, as in magic, the performer knows the power of illusion,
but the performer also knows that the illusion has no inherent power. The
illusion is empty of reality. For the audience, the performer erases the
distinction between illusion and reality. But in his or her mind, the performer
is obsessively conscious of the difference between illusion and reality. The
power of the performer lies in first knowing the difference between illusion

319. For a historical evaluation of legal realism in America, see generally AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
320. Realism and its intellectual progeny, including critical race theory and gender
jurisprudence, exposed the artificial chasm between the personal and professional dimensions of
the legal analyst. A legal analyst can pretend to separate his or her personal self from legal
reasoning. This dissociation, however, cannot be taken seriously. See id. at xiv (“The Realist
credo is often caricatured as the proposition that how a judge decides a case on a given day
depends primarily on what he or she had for breakfast.”).
321. The magical words found in the first ten Amendments—freedom of speech, right to bear
arms, unreasonable searches and seizures, due process of law, speedy and public trial, cruel and
unusual punishments, and others—have been pivotal in the development of constitutional rights.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I–X.
322. “Interstate commerce,” a powerful magical phrase, though not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution, has been invoked in expanding the federal legislative reach. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“commerce . . . among the several states”); REBECCA S. SHOEMAKER, THE
WHITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 195 (2004) (describing the expansion of
federal powers through a expansive interpretation of the commerce clause).
323. “Separate but equal,” a constitutional fiction signifying segregation laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer a respectable phrase. See ANN WALLACE SHARP,
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: THE DESEGREGATION OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 4 (2007) (recognizing
that the “fallacy of ‘separate but equal’ was obliterated in the American courts”).
324. “Best interests of the child,” a magical phrase in family law, continues to inform legal
rulings and analysis. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., Introduction to the Paperback Edition of
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE, at xiii, xiii
(paperback ed. 1998).
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and reality and then making the skillful effort to erase the difference.325 The
skillful performer does not deny the existence of illusion but rather
concentrates on hiding the method and persuading the audience that what they
are witnessing is real. The audience realizes that the magic it is watching is
unreal. In many cases, the audience, immersed in a state of innocence or selffoolery, is unwilling and perhaps unable to see the gap between illusion and
reality. The magician successfully eliminates the distinction between illusion
and reality partly through skill and partly because the audience has purchased
tickets for self-deception. Thus, magic exists because the performer and the
audience have signed a contract for the enjoyment of illusion.
In law, however, the consumers of legal and judicial services have signed
no such contract. Legal professionals may enjoy the performance of legal
reasoning, but the consequences of legal reasoning are not illusions; they are
real and include losing property, liberty, and even life. To make such losses
bearable for the losing party, legal phrases may be chanted and hallowed in
creative ways.326 The public, however, has a right to demand that lawyers and
judges not play games but engage in conscientious legal reasoning and own the
consequences of legal outcomes rather than hide behind the mask of the
dissociation paradigm.
B.

Gaming by Judges

Kevin Burke, a judge for the Minnesota District Court of Hennepin
County, argues that a commitment to “procedural fairness” is the (magical) key
to the delivery of justice that litigants would accept.327 Judge Burke seems to
sincerely believe that litigants are much more likely to accept court decisions
and appreciate the rule of law if judges listen to litigants, respect them, and
explain the decisions they make. Sophisticated reasoning derived from
complex statutes and case precedents, which litigants may not comprehend, is
insufficient to persuade a losing party that the rule of law has been enforced.
The rule of law is a perception rooted in the ordinary courtroom behavior of

325. See MAGIC: STAGE ILLUSIONS, SPECIAL EFFECTS AND TRICK PHOTOGRAPHY 27 (Albert
A. Hopkins ed., Dover Publ’n 1976) (1898) (noting that the magician has great incentive to keep
the workings of the most entertaining tricks a secret because those tricks require the most stage
fittings and apparatuses).
326. Jessie Allen, A Theory of Adjudication: Law as Magic, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773,
774–76 (2008) (“In law, as in ritual magic, transforming the meaning of a set of social
circumstances can happen through common formal and performative techniques that may look
like mere distractions . . . . [T]hey may provide a mechanism through which official legal
decisions take on some of the affective power of lived experience and so generate the . . .
commitment that leads to social transformation.”).
327. Judge Kevin Burke, Understanding the International Rule of Law as a Commitment to
Procedural Fairness, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 357, 365 (2009).
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judges.328 A respectful judge who conducts a fair hearing generates more
goodwill about the rule of law than a disrespectful judge who knows the
intricacies of law and delivers a legally perfect decision. “For judges and
many lawyers, the single most difficult concept to accept is that most people
care more about procedural fairness—the kind of treatment they receive in
court—than they do about winning or losing the particular case.”329
The courtroom atmospherics, including judicial respect for litigants, are
important for the dispensation of justice.330 However, Judge Burke does not
address the more difficult question of the hazards of explaining decisions to
litigants. Few trial judges, for example, would inform litigants that they have
lost a case under an “unfair” or “unjust” statutory provision, because any such
explanation, though honest in the judge’s view, would not satisfy the losing
litigants.331 Likewise, few trial judges would say to litigants that the precedent
under which the case was decided no longer makes sense.332 Surely, the judge
can explain the law under which the case is decided. This explanation might
indeed be persuasive if the judge agrees with the rationale of the law. The
explanation, however, will lack personal commitment if the judge disapproves
of the applied law.333
In explaining decisions, therefore, judges must choose either the
dissociation paradigm or the ownership principle. Under the dissociation
paradigm, the judge must censor the negative personal views about the
soundness of the applied law. This censoring, however, might weaken the
explanation since the judge would have preferred that the laws were otherwise.
The judge’s lack of commitment might come through in the explanation. The
judge may deform the law and decide the case according to his or her personal
notions of morality, fairness, and justice. In such a scenario, the judge knows
that the losing party would have prevailed had the judge applied the law as is,
rather than modifying it to suit the judge’s personal notion of justice. In either
case, the judge will experience personal dishonesty and practice a form of

328. See id. (“The rule of law must create an atmosphere in the courthouse that allows
litigants to feel that they are important and their case is not trivial.”).
329. Id. at 367.
330. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 499 (2008).
331. While lower courts are bound to apply an “unjust law,” the high court may overrule the
unjust law. See, e.g., Villareal v. State Dep’t of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989) (quoting
City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803, 805 (Ariz. 1972)) (recognizing that the court may
overrule unjust “judge-made” law).
332. Cf. id. (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court had no reluctance to overrule a law that
was “out of step with the times”).
333. Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 462 (1999) (arguing that judges are unlikely
to write persuasive legal opinions if they themselves are not convinced of the right answer).
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deception. Further, the judge must experience a split personality. Indeed, the
explanation might backfire as litigants and lawyers might be sense the judge’s
deception.
C. Gaming by Lawyers
Geoffrey Hazard calls law practice a “Machiavellian calling,” since it is
necessary for a lawyer “to be a great feigner and dissembler.”334 Lawyers
game the legal system for a legion of reasons, some unworthy of professional
respect and some honorable. Some lawyers engage in gaming to fight for
justice, fairness, and other ideological goals compatible with their personal
conscience. Some game the system for monetary reasons. Some adopt the
dissociation paradigm and voluntarily remove their conscience from the
practice of law, while others care little for systemic justice or personal
conscience but are ready and willing to serve clients. I have discussed cynical
advocacy in depth in another article.335 Subscribing to no moral principles,
cynical lawyers would serve any clients capable of paying for legal services.
But money alone may not explain cynical advocacy. Similarly, some gaming
lawyers are so preoccupied with winning the case that they have little regard
for the law, higher law, or personal conscience.336 They are the consummate
practitioners of what works.
Courts repeatedly take notice but rarely speak positively of what they call
“clever lawyers.”337 Courts point out that the clever lawyers can construct
“multiple meanings for any word in any context.”338 And, a vague,
convoluted, and conflicting statute furnishes “fertile ground for clever lawyers
to breed wasteful litigation.”339 In fact, no statute, no matter how clearly it
emblazons the lawmakers’ intentions on its face, can preempt lawyers from
finding ambiguity in it.340 The courts also recognize the power of lawyers to
draft “a truly byzantine document” that subverts market conventions and

334. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 75, 89 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000) (quoting NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 70 (Luigi Ricci trans., Modern Library
1950)).
335. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
547 (2008).
336. Cf. United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 494 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.,
United States v. Garay, 921 F.2d 330 (1st Cir. 1990) (criticizing the motif of “‘winning’ at all
costs”).
337. In re Tousa, Inc. 422 B.R. 783, 864 n.51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (“There is something
inherently distasteful about really clever lawyers overreaching.”).
338. Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
339. Bender v. Glendenning, 632 S.E.2d 330, 346 (W. Va. 2006).
340. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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customary understandings.341 Likewise, the narrative power of lawyers cannot
be overemphasized as they can describe even a “garden variety” fraud as a
lawful transaction.342
Courts deny relief when they sense that lawyers or their clients are gaming
the legal system.343 A criminal defendant, for example, may game the criminal
justice system and forgo DNA testing at trial in the hope that other evidence
would be found insufficient for conviction. After conviction, however, the
defendant demands the DNA testing in the hope that contamination or some
other mishap could support the defendant’s innocence. Of course, clients need
the help of lawyers to strategize the game. The defendant’s lawyer, who
knows that the DNA testing would hurt the client at trial, may advise the client
not to take the test. In so advising, the lawyer, too, is gaming the system even
though the lawyer is not violating any laws.344
Gaming lawyers develop the reputation of feared creatures who skillfully
manipulate the legal process in “befogging the case; . . . holding back and
concealing the truth; . . . pulling the wool over the eyes of the judge and of the
jury; . . . distorting the facts; [or] . . . misleading or bullyragging the
witnesses.”345 This reputation may follow the gaming lawyers in all cases. The
gaming lawyers, desperate to serve their clients, can fail by the very methods
they mobilize to win the case. Gaming is a self-defeating proposition as it
presupposes that the gaming lawyer is smarter than the judge and jury and
would be able to outfox them into believing a certain version of the story
favorable to the client. In the gaming process, however, the lawyer can reveal
what is being concealed and befoul the courtroom air with mistrust. When the
gaming lawyer loses trust of the judge or the jury, even favorable facts and
laws do not translate into favorable rulings for the client. Gaming, therefore,
can be a highly unreliable and self-defeating tool of legal reasoning.
D. Gaming by Law Professors
Among legal professionals, law professors enjoy the most extensive
freedom to render professional services consistent with the ownership
principle. Unlike lawyers, law professors, in their teaching, academic writings,
and professional presentations, represent no clients and have no pressure to
341. Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No. 98-5566, 2002 WL 188473, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2002).
342. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990).
343. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2329 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)
(proposing denial of relief for post-conviction DNA testing when defendant refuses to undergo
testing at trial).
344. Id. at 2314.
345. R.S. Gray, S.F. Bar Ass’n, Reorganization of the Bar as a Necessary Means to Justice,
Address Before the California Bar Association Annual Convention (Nov. 21, 1913), in CAL. BAR
ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 70, 84 (1914).
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bend the law or engage in gaming to serve vested interests. Unlike judges, law
professors are under no doctrinal pressure to adhere to precedents or to
prevailing interpretations of statutes. They are free to critique the law as is and
offer amendments, new visions, and new directions that the law, in their view,
must take. Law professors can freely advise lawmakers and judges to improve
the quality of legal services and demands of justice. This academic freedom to
provide analyses and critiques of law rejuvenates the legal system that may
otherwise function under the dead weight of precedents and doctrines. A legal
system that does not guarantee robust academic freedom risks a stultified
regime of laws shorn of sincere and fruitful criticisms.346
As a matter of law, however, academic freedom is far less than a
constitutional right or liberty.347 During the communism scare in the United
States, the Supreme Court upheld the academic freedom of universities and
colleges, declaring that “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”348 These are comforting
words for academics engaged in exploring ideas consistent with their personal
conscience. Note, however, that this academic freedom belongs to academic
institutions and not to individual professors.349
The threat to academic freedom may not derive from the state but from
academic institutions themselves. A question arises whether academic
institutions can restrict the contents of professors’ scholarship and teaching.
The Supreme Court jurisprudence offers no clear answer to this question. Law
professors as citizens enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, but they are
also employees of universities and colleges. Free speech protections available
to professors as citizens may not be available to them as university
employees.350 College and university professors frequently fail to obtain relief
from courts when they assert academic freedom contrary to institutional

346. See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 960 n.71 (2009)
(“Professors do not have academic freedom to violate professional norms at will, yet professional
norms ought to be subject to criticism and disagreement.”).
347. William E. Thro, Academic Freedom: Constitutional Myths and Practical Realities, 19 J.
PERSONNEL EVALUATION IN EDUC. 135, 137 (2007).
348. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
349. Matthew W. Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 829
(1983) (explaining the recognition of institutional academic freedom and pluralism). But see
Areen, supra note 346, at 948 n.11 (recognizing debate whether academic freedom applies to
individuals or only institutions).
350. Public employees, such as prosecutors, do not enjoy unrestricted expressive activities
within the scope of their employment. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
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policies.351 Even though colleges and universities rarely prevent individual
professors from exercising personal conscience in scholarly writings, no
constitutional right protects any such professorial freedom. Theoretically,
public universities may restrict contents of teaching and scholarship,352 forcing
professors to engage in dissociative scholarship. Even if content-restrictive
university regulations are not formulated, practical methods—such as
promotion, salary, and even collegial respect—may be employed to deter law
professors from engaging in intellectually honest scholarship emanating from
deeply held passions against social wrongs, injustices, or excesses of law.353
Some law professors may resort to gaming the system by engaging in
technical scholarship that has little to do with their personal conscience,
personal morality, or personal sense of justice.354 First, law professors may
write in a formal, objective, dispassionate style, which offers description but
no prescription, analysis but no experience, objectivity but no emotion, and
trite expressions but no heartfelt language.355 Second, they may respond to
institutional pressure by withholding personal views from scholarship,
particularly if judicial positions are their attainable ambition. An ideologically
transparent scholarly record, whether liberal or conservative in content, is a
formidable burden to carry through the confirmation process of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Third, and most important, law professors may fear the
tenure process356 and the allegation that their scholarship is radical or
subversive. Even tenured law professors, who engage in iconoclastic
351. See, e.g., Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that public
university professor lacks First Amendment right to contest school’s grading procedures);
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414 (4th Cir. 2000) (recognizing professors lack right of
academic freedom to decide contents of their scholarship); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d
488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that public university professors have no First Amendment
right to decide what they teach).
352. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (holding that speech by public employees made pursuant to
their official duties is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
353. See Robin D. Barnes, Natural Legal Guardians of Judicial Independence and Academic
Freedom, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1471–72 (2009) (analyzing the case of John Yoo, the
author of the Bush Administration torture memos, and the public pressure to fire him from his
tenured faculty position).
354. See Markovits, supra note 333, at 462 (“In my judgment, the failure of law professors to
take legal argument seriously in the ‘conviction’ sense has also had a number of socially
undesirable consequences.”).
355. But cf. Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”:
Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1804 (1993) (recommending a
classroom culture that is engaged, passionate, and rich in intellectual discourse).
356. Professors may fear the tenure process despite the fact that it is designed to promote
academic freedom without sacrificing the professor’s economic security. See Robert J. Tepper &
Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to
Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 172 (2009) (arguing that the purpose of
tenure is, and ought to be, assurance of academic freedom of teaching and research).
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scholarship, may lose the opportunity to teach at prestigious law schools.
Under these combined pressures, law professors may engage in mechanistic,
doctrinal scholarship that adds jargon to the field but does nothing to expose
and reform its subterranean value-structure.357
Despite dissociative pressures, few law professors, particularly after they
are tenured, choose to engage in insincere scholarship divorced from personal
conscience. And even fewer law professors would choose to live with a dead
conscience and abandon moral judgment. In fact, the pendulum has shifted
toward highly personalized scholarship as more and more law professors offer
scathing criticisms of law and the legal system.358 These criticisms are derived
from race, gender, sexual orientation, economics, and a legion of other
ideological perspectives. It would be highly unusual for law professors to
decline ownership of these writings, argue that they were simply explaining the
law as it is, and claim personal conscience has no place in the academy.
While most law professors engage in intellectually upright scholarship,
money-driven gaming has infected the academy. One commentator points out
that law reviews fail to screen writings tied to financial interests.359
“[C]orporations and conservative think tanks with corporate underwriters,
continue to fund research for the purpose of presenting their findings to courts
in order to discredit jury verdicts that awarded punitive damages against
them.”360 Prestigious scholars with access to prestigious journals may be
solicited to engage in “hired-gun research.”361 For example, a prestigious team
of scholars received funds from Exxon to conduct research on jury awards of
punitive damages.362 The authors concluded that juries are ill-equipped to
assess punitive damages in dollar amounts.363 And they were able to publish
their research in the Yale Law Journal. No accusations have been made to
assert that the research was tainted. However, the United States Supreme
Court refused to rely on this research in a case on punitive damages.364
357. This form of scholarship, however, is rarely rewarded with “tenure at the better law
schools.” Michael Livingston, Confessions of an Economist Killer: A Reply to Kronman’s “Lost
Lawyer”, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1592, 1602 (1995) (book review).
358. See Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the PostRealist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 359 (2008) (describing how criticisms of the legal
realists in the middle of the twentieth century shifted legal scholarship from a traditional formalist
account of the common law to a more instrumentalist perspective).
359. Shireen A. Barday, Note, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal
Profession, 61 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2008).
360. Id. at 712.
361. Id.
362. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2071, n.††† (1998) (acknowledging corporate support).
363. Id. at 2142.
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Corporate-funded research permeates numerous fields of science on the
theory that a collaborative relationship between corporations and the academy
can accelerate the invention and manufacturing of products beneficial for the
public in general. This “win-win” strategy, however, works more to the
benefit of corporations rather than the public; in some cases, the corporatefunded research is detrimental to the safety and health of the general public.365
Pharmaceutical companies, for example, regularly fund research to promote
Money can corrupt academic research when
drugs and biologics.366
researchers manipulate the data to advance corporate interests. Academic
researchers would not need to engage in a wholesale fraudulent research but
subtly tilt the research in favor of corporate clients. The extent to which
money-driven research has infected legal scholarship remains to be
documented.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that professional responsibilities arise within the
connectionist web of laws, ethics, and personal conscience. Lawyers, judges,
and law professors must not renounce personal conscience in providing
professional services. Willful reasoning derived from personal conscience
alone, however, cannot be the driver of legitimate reasoning. Legal
professionals must pursue cognitive coherence by connecting personal
conscience with the knowledge of laws and ethics. Lawyers must not accept
the dissociation paradigm that forces them to game the system or surrender
personal conscience in serving clients. Judges must not accept the dissociation
paradigm that forces them to game legal reasoning or serve as conscience-free
enforcers of laws. If legal reasoning derived from binding legal sources yields
multiple solutions to a legal problem, judges must choose the solution most
compatible with their personal conscience. This choice, though regularly
exercised by high-court judges, is available to all judges. Of all legal
professionals, law professors are in the most privileged position to teach and
write in the connectionist domain of laws, ethics, and personal conscience.
They have little excuse to turn off personal conscience in teaching and writing.
A legal profession, which values legal professionals as fully integrated human
365. See Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence Can Be Like the Thunder:
Access to Pharmaceutical Data at the FDA, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85 (2006) (arguing
that greater corporate involvement in clinical science and the culture of secrecy it brings may
inhibit the free flow of scientific data and thus slow the scientific development of beneficial
products).
366. See Keith J. Winstein & David Armstrong, Top Pain Scientist Fabricated Data in
Studies, Hospital Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A12 (“A prominent Massachusetts
anesthesiologist allegedly fabricated 21 medical studies that claimed to show benefits from
painkillers like Vioxx and Celebrex.”).
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beings rather than mere service-providers separated from their inner values,
cannot owe rigid adherence to the dissociation paradigm.

